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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdiction is in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to: Art. 
VIII § 5 of the Utah Constitution; U.C.A. §§ 59-1-608 (1987) and 
78-2-2(3) (j) (1991); and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Plaintiffs raise this additional issue: 
Issue: Did the trial court err in ruling that a direct 
violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 (hereafter "§ 111") is not actionable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereafter "§ 1983") when it granted 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiffs1 Amended 
Complaint? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing 
an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we review only the facts 
alleged in the complaint. In determining whether the trial 
court properly granted the motion, we accept the factual 
allegations in the [amended] complaint as true and consider 
them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, [cites omitted]. We 
will affirm the dismissal only if it is apparent that as a 
matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts 
alleged, [cites omitted]. Because we are considering only the 
legal sufficiency of the complaint, we give the trial court's 
ruling no deference and review it under a correctness 
standard. 
Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
4 U.S.C. § 111 
U.C.A. § 59-10-529 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-14 
U.C.A. § 78-33-1 and 2 
Utah Constitution Art. I, § 7 
Utah Constitution, Art. If § 2 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 11 
Utah Constitution, Art. I and 24 
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case - For many years Defendants unlawfully 
taxed Plaintiffs by granting state income tax exemptions to retired 
state employees covered under the state retirement system while 
illegally taxing federal retirees. Three hundred thirty-five 
Plaintiffs, plus a number of federal retiree organizations filed a 
Class Action Complaint in the Tax Division of Third District Court 
seeking among other things, 1) a declaratory order that Utahfs 
taxation of federal retirees was unlawful for all tax years in 
dispute, 2) an order compelling Defendants to recognize Plaintiffs1 
class claims for refund, and to compute and pay refunds, and 3) an 
award of costs and attorneys1 fees (in the § 1983 action). 
Course of Proceedings - Plaintiffs submit the following 
addition to the statement of the course of proceedings submitted by 
Defendants: 
On April 5, 1989 the State Tax Commission (hereafter 
"Commission") issued a widely published press release stating Davis 
was not retroactive and refunds would not be granted to federal 
retirees. R. 130. This denial of refunds by the Commission was 
prior to the filing of Plaintiffs1 Complaint. After the Complaint 
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was filed, the trial court relieved Plaintiffs of the requirement 
to exhaust administrative remedies. R. 250. The Plaintiff class 
was then certified. R. 289. However, the Commission proceeded to 
schedule administrative hearings on May 30, 1990 involving members 
of the Plaintiff class. R. 292. The trial court temporarily 
enjoined the Commission from conducting administrative hearings, 
granting members of the class the opportunity to opt out of the 
class and proceed before the Commission should they choose. R. 
367. 
Disposition in the lower court - By summary judgment the trial 
court declared the Utah taxing scheme to be in violation of 4 
U.S.C. § 111, found refunds to be appropriate under U.C.A. § 59-10-
529 for the 1985-88 tax years and to be appropriate under U.C.A. § 
59-1-301 for the 1988 tax year, ordered the Commission to issue 
refunds to members of the class who paid state income tax on 
federal retirement income during 1985-88, and awarded interest, 
costs and attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs. R. 1140, 1141. 
Statement of facts - Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the 
statement of facts made by Defendants in the following respects: 
Defendants repeatedly cite as facts, claims that were stricken 
by the trial court as being irrelevant. Plaintiffs did not nor 
were they required to file responsive affidavits to contest the 
assertions in Defendants1 stricken affidavits. Defendants1 cite to 
facts not found by the trial court on pages 10, 12 and 13 of 
Defendants1 brief dealing with the belief of the Commission, the 
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good faith of the State, the "estimated" refunds to be paid to 
Plaintiffs, and the financial impact to the State of Utah. 
Defendants also argue these claims in their brief as if they were 
facts. (See pages 63 and 64 of Defendants1 brief). Plaintiffs 
submit Defendants have improperly represented these allegations as 
facts in their statement of facts. 
Plaintiffs hereby submit the following additional facts: 
1. Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff class received 
pay or compensation as a result of personal services rendered as 
officers of employees of the United States. R. 289, 1120. 
2. The State of Utah taxed the income of Plaintiffs and 
members of the Plaintiff class and did not tax the income of 
retired state employees. R. 401, 1120. 
3. The U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis v. Michigan on March 
28, 1989. 
4. On April 5, 1989, the Commission issued a press release 
stating that refunds would not be granted to federal retirees and 
that Davis was not retroactive. R. 130. Addendum, Exh. 1. 
5. The plaintiff class consists of approximately 34,000 
individuals and/or estates, the majority of whom are of advanced 
age. R. 130, 213, 251-252, 1121. 
6. The size of each class member's refund claim is small in 
amount in relation to the high cost of pursuing a resolution of the 
claim. R. 252, 1121. 
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7. Prior to April 17, 1989 Defendants received hundreds of 
phone calls from members of the plaintiff class protesting the 
collection of 1988 Utah state income taxes on Plaintiffs' federal 
retirement compensation. R. 402, 403, 1121. 
8. Representative Plaintiffs and more than 3,000 Utah 
members of the National Association of Retired Federal Employees 
(NARFE), protested for themselves and "all others similarly 
situated", the collection of state income tax on their federal 
retirement benefits by filing with Defendants on or before April 
17, 1989 a "Notice of Claim", and "Class Claim for Refund", seeking 
a refund of all state income taxes paid on federal retirement 
benefits for the 1985 through 1988 tax years, specifically alleging 
the illegality of the state income tax under federal and state law. 
R. 402, 455-463, 1122. 
9. Many representative Plaintiffs and hundreds of members of 
the plaintiff class also protested payment of their 1988 state 
income taxes by calling the Commission, by filing written protests 
and by filing 1988 amended returns prior to the 1988 due date, or 
by filing claims for protection of rights in the form and manner 
prescribed by the Commission. R. 402, 464-591, 1122. 
10. Representative Plaintiffs for themselves and all others 
similarly situated, plus over 3,000 Utah members of the National 
Association of Retired Federal Employees (NARFE) filed timely class 
claims for refund with the Commission for the years 1985 through 
1988. R. 403, 455-593, 1122. Addendum, Exh. 2. 
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11. Individual class members filed claims with the Commission 
for the years indicated below seeking a refund of state income 
taxes paid on federal retirement benefits. The number of such 
individual claims filed with the Commission for each tax year were: 
1985: 11,921; 1986: 16,892; 1987: 15,185; 1988: 11,827 
R. 403. 
12. On March 30, 1990, Plaintiff class, by and through legal 
representatives, filed a "Protective Claim" with the Commission on 
a form prepared by the Commission. R. 403, 593. Exh. 2. 
13. The Commission instructed Plaintiffs in February 1990 to 
file protective claims by April 16, 1990, to protect their claims 
for refund for the 1985 and 1986 tax years within the three-year 
statute of limitations. R. 926-934, 1123. 
14. The Commission has consistently and publicly taken the 
position since April 5, 1989, that refunds of state income taxes 
paid by federal retirees will not be paid. R. 595-604, 917-934. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
By taxing federal retirees while exempting its own state 
retirees, Utah violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and the rule in Davis v. 
Michigan. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Beam v. 
Georgia is dispositive on the retroactivity issue of Davis under 
the Federal Doctrine. Under Beam, other courts are no longer free 
to apply the Chevron test to determine the retroactivity of a 
previously decided U.S. Supreme Court case; they must apply the 
same rule that was applied to the litigants in the case. The case 
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must be read as being retroactive to its litigants if it is silent 
on the issue of retroactivity or if the court does not reserve the 
issue in the opinion itself. 
The Supreme Court in Davis characterized its opinion as the 
plain reading of an unambiguous statute. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has never refused to give retroactive effect to the plain meaning 
of an unambiguous statute. To do so would offend basic separation 
of power principles. 
Utah has a specific income tax refund remedy which 
incorporates by definition Federal Tax Law and Procedure. Although 
Defendants claim Plaintiffs must first pay taxes under protest 
before they can obtain refunds, neither the refund statute nor the 
federal law so requires. The federal refund procedure, 
incorporated into the Utah statute by specific reference, abolished 
the requirement of a payment under protest more than sixty years 
ago. Utah's statute allows for refunds of tax "overpayments", a 
term specifically defined in the Utah Statute and in federal law to 
encompass taxes unlawfully assessed. Under Utah law, the more 
recent and specific refund of income tax remedy must be preferred 
over the ancient and general payment under protest remedy. 
Defendants improperly ask this Court to craft a new remedy in 
place of the income tax refund statutes even if Davis is 
retroactive. To do so, however, would violate state and federal 
constitutional protection. Defendants assume the equities in the 
case favor them, but the equities follow the law. 
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When the Commission publicly announced that the Davis case was 
not retroactive and that refunds would not be paid, plaintiffs 
sought a declaratory order in district court. The court had 
jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties. The trial court 
properly applied U.C.A. § 63-46b-14 to relieve plaintiffs of the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies before the Commission because 
the burden to the taxpayers would far outweigh the minimal benefit 
to be gained through hearings. The Commission had neither the 
authority to invalidate Utah's tax laws, nor the authority and 
expertise to decide the retroactivity of a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision. When the Commission ignored the court's order relieving 
exhaustion of remedies and attempted to compel five members of the 
class to appear at formal tax commission hearings, the trial court 
properly and joined enforcement of its prior order. 
In deciding the legal issues in protecting the rights of the 
class, the trial court has not prevented the Commission from doing 
what it does best. If tax refunds are sustained on appeal, each 
member of the class will need to file an individual amended income 
tax return, which may be reviewed and challenged in a normal 
administrative process. 
The trial court properly defined the class. Defendants' 
principal objection to the class definition is the granting of 
refunds to persons who did not pay their taxes under protest. This 
is a substantive issue and should be considered as such. 
Defendants do not dispute the propriety of a class action. U.C.A. 
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§ 78-33-11 in the Declaratory Judgment Act requires the court to 
join all parties in the action who have a claim or interest 
effected by the declaration; the class action is the obvious 
mechanism for accomplishing this. 
Section 111 makes no distinction between civilian retirees and 
military retirees. Defendants objection on this issue is without 
merit. 
Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to object to the 
proposed final order and did make all objections they had to make. 
Defendants1 criticism of the trial court is unfair. 
Two recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have supported 
a § 1983 civil rights action in this case. The trial courtfs 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' § 1983 civil rights action should be 
reversed. The trial court's award of fees and the costs of return 
preparation should be sustained. 
The Utah Constitution requires frequent recurrence to 
fundamental principles. Fairness in the exaction of taxes is one 
of the fundamental principles upon which this country was founded. 
This case presents an unusual opportunity to review and apply those 
fundamental principles necessary to a free government. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED § 111 TO INVALIDATE UTAH'S 
TAXING SCHEME. 
A. SECTION 111 IS A LIMITED WAIVER OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX 
IMMUNITY. 
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The Federal Statute, § 111 is a limited waiver by the United 
States of its intergovernmental tax immunity, a doctrine derived 
from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 3316 (1819) , in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the State of Maryland could not impose a 
discriminatory tax on the Bank of the United States. Cited in 
Davis v. Michigan Dep't. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), 
(hereafter "Davis"). For over one hundred years, McCulloch was 
read broadly to prohibit one sovereign from taxing the employees of 
another. In 1938, however, the Court decided in Helvering v. 
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), that the federal government could 
impose nondiscriminatory income taxes on most state employees. 
That decision was followed a year later by Graves v. New York ex 
rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)1, in which the Court, for the 
first time, permitted nondiscriminatory state taxation of federal 
1
 The 1939 Graves decision and enactment of § 111 directly 
impacted Utah law. Until Graves and § 111, Utah exempted all 
federal income (including pensions) from state income taxation. 
Ut.Rev.St. 1933, § 80-14-3. In 1938 the Utah Tax Commission 
challenged the applicability of the exemption in the case of an 
attorney employed by a federal agency, lost at the Utah Supreme 
Court and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for a judicial 
delineation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. 
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion the same day it 
issued the Graves opinion, referring Utah to Graves and instructing 
Utah that intergovernmental immunity no longer presented the 
nondiscriminatory taxation of federal employee compensation. 
VanCott v. State Tax Commission, 306 U.S. 511, 59 S.Ct. 605, 83 
L.Ed. 950 (1939), decision on remand 96 P.2d 740 (Utah 1939). Utah 
effectively repealed the exemption three (3) days after the Utah 
Supreme Court's December 28, 1939 opinion on remand. Laws 41, Ch. 
85, § 2 (effective January 1, 1940). Utah lost no time in rushing 
to embrace the new intergovernmental immunity rules codified in § 
111 (1939) . Now the State attempts to distance itself from its own 
legal history and calls it all "unforeseeable", "a surprise." 
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employees. Davis, 489 U.S. at 811. Section 111 provides in 
relevant part: 
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or 
compensation for personal service as an officer or employee of 
the United States...by,a duly constituted taxing authority 
having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate 
against the officer or employee because of the source of the 
pay or compensation, (emphasis added). 
The waiver of federal sovereign immunity allowed by Graves and 
codified in § 111 in only a limited waiver. Section 111 expressly 
prohibits state taxation which discriminates against federal 
officers or employees on the basis of the source of the pay or 
compensation which is being taxed. Davis at 808. 
B. DAVIS HELD THAT DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION OF FEDERAL 
RETIREES VIOLATED § 111. 
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court applied § 111 and 
the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity to state taxation of 
federal retirement benefits. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court held the 
Michigan tax scheme violated § 111 and the coextensive prohibition 
against discriminatory taxes embodied in the constitutional 
principle of intergovernmental tax immunity. Id. at 813. 
The Court in Davis applied a three-part analysis. First, the 
Court found that federal retirement pay is "pay or compensation for 
personal services as an officer or employee of the United States." 
Id. at 808. In rejecting the State of Michiganfs argument that § 
111 applied only to current federal employees, not federal 
retirees, the Supreme Court explained: 
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While retirement pay is not actually disbursed during the time 
an individual is working for the Government, the amount of 
benefits to be received in retirement is based and computed 
upon the individual's salary and years of service.... [B]ecause 
these benefits accrue to employees on account of their service 
to the Government, they fall squarely within the category of 
compensation for services rendered "as an officer or employee 
of the United States." (citations omitted). 
Id. at 808. 
Second, the Supreme Court held that Michiganfs disparate tax 
treatment of retirement benefits violated § 111 and was 
unconstitutional because it "discriminate[ed] in favor of retired 
state employees and against federal employees." Id. at 817. 
Third, the Court rejected Michigan's attempts to justify the 
discrimination, noting that the State's interest in discriminating 
"is simply irrelevant." Id. at 816. Having found retirement pay 
to be immune from discriminatory taxation and the Michigan tax 
statute to be discriminatory, the Supreme Court concluded the 
statute violated § 111 and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity. Id. at 817. 
C. UTAH TAXED FEDERAL RETIREES IN VIOLATION OF § 111. 
Defendants have conceded that Davis applied to the Utah tax 
scheme that taxed federal retirees while exempting state retirees, 
and that Davis required revision of Utah's tax lav/. Df bf p. 84. 
Defendants do not challenge the trial court's ruling that 
Utah's taxing scheme violated § 111 as defined in Davis. Their 
principle defense is that the Davis decision was "unforeshadowed" 
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and therefore should not apply retroactively to the tax years in 
dispute: 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. 
II. RETROACTIVITY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES IS DETERMINED BY 
FEDERAL RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE. 
In determining the retroactivity of a case, lower courts 
properly refer to the rules of the court announcing the decision. 
See Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 
287 U.S. 358, (1932). Retroactivity of a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision is governed by the federal doctrine of retroactivity.2 
American Trucking Association v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323 (1990) 
(hereafter "ATA"). 
Since Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three landmark 
retroactivity cases which circumscribe the present boundaries of 
the federal retroactivity doctrine. (McKesson, ATA, and Beajn) . 
The trial court correctly followed the federal retroactivity 
doctrine set forth in these recent cases. 
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISION IN JAMES B. BEAM 
DISTILLING CO. V. GEORGIA, U.S. Ill S.CT. 2439 115 L.ED. 2D 481 
(1991) (HEREAFTER "BEAM") IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE RETROACTIVITY 
ISSUE. 
2
 Although Defendants concede the application of federal 
retroactively doctrine, they seek refuge under -Rio Algom Corp. v. 
San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) , Loyal Order of Moose No. 
259 v. County Board of Equalization, and Board of Education v. Salt 
Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983). (Df bf p. 88). Though 
Utahfs retroactivity rules may differ from the federal doctrine in 
some respects (ftnt 4), the "law changing" threshold is the same. 
In the cases cited, and in all other Utah decisions discovered by 
Plaintiffs, the Utah Supreme Court has given prospective-only 
application to law reversing rules arising from difficult issues of 
constitutional interpretation. None involved conduct which 
violated the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. 
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K. BEAM REJECTS "SELECTIVE OR MODIFIED" RETROACTIVITY. 
The U.S. Supreme Court applied the commerce clause to 
invalidate a Hawaii tax which discriminated against out of state 
liquor purchasers in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 
(1984) (hereafter "Bacchus"). Shortly after Bacchus, the James H. 
Beam liquor company filed suit in Georgia for refunds of taxes paid 
before Bacchus. The Georgia Supreme court acknowledged the 
unconstitutionality of Georgia's tax under the holding of Bacchus, 
but applied analysis contained in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 
U.S. 97 (1971), (hereafter "Chevron"), to label Bacchus a 
prospective-only opinion. In its analysis, the Georgia Supreme 
Court noted Bacchus had reversed prior U.S. Supreme Court commerce 
clause precedents. The Georgia Supreme Court also noted it had 
specifically ruled the challenged statute to be constitutional one 
year after its enactment in 1938. Because the cost of granting 
refunds to the State of Georgia was substantial, the Court found 
the Chevron analysis favored non-retroactivity and refunds were 
denied. James H. Beam appealed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in 
Beam. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court ruled the Georgia Supreme Court 
erred in: 1) applying the Chevron analysis to a case already 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, and 2) in failing to see that 
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Bacchus followed the normal course of full retroactivity in civil 
cases.3 
Beam rejected "selective or modified" retroactivity by 
mandating that any opinion applied retroactively to its litigants 
must apply retroactively to all others similarly situated whose 
claims are not barred. 
Thus, the question is whether it is error to refuse to apply 
a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing 
the rule has already done so. We hold that it is, principles 
of equality and stare decisis here prevailing over any claim 
based on a Chevron Oil analysis. 
* * * 
The grounds for our decision today are narrow. They are 
confined entirely to an issue of choice of law: when the 
court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case 
it must do so with respect to all others not barred by 
procedural requirements or res judicata. 
Beam at 2446. 
The Court noted that "we have never employed Chevron Oil to 
the end of modified civil prospectivity". Id. at 2445. Justice 
White concurred, "there being no precedent in civil cases applying 
a new rule to the parties in the case but not to other similarly 
situated. . ."4 Id. at 2448 J. White, concurring opinion). (Even 
3
 In Welch v. Cadre Capital, 946 F.2d 185 (2nd Cir. 1991), 
the Second Circuit addressed a remand in light of Beam and provided 
an insightful analysis of Beam. 
4
 In this respect, Federal retroactivity doctrine differs 
from the Utah rule. See: Rio Algom v. Corp. v. San Juan County, 
681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984). 
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the dissent did not dispute this total lack of precedent for a 
contrary rule). 
B. BEAM REJECTS USE OP THE CHEVRON ANALYSIS BY ANOTHER COURT 
ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE RETROACTIVITY OF A UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT CASE. 
What of the Chevron analysis after Beam? As the Court noted 
in Beam: 
Both parties have assumed the applicability of the Chevron Oil 
test. . .But we have never employed Chevron Oil to the end of 
modified civil prospectivity. 
* * * 
Our decision here does limit the possible applications of the 
Chevron Oil analysis, however irrelevant Chevron Oil may 
otherwise be to this case. Because the rejection of modified 
prospectivity precludes retroactive application of a new rule 
to some litigants when it is not applied to others, the 
Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying 
on the equities of the particular case [citation omitted]. 
Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new 
rule, it is chosen for all others who might seek its 
prospective application. The applicability of rules of law 
are not to be switched on and off according to individual 
hardship; allowing relitigation of choice-of-law issues would 
only compound the challenge to the stabilizing purpose of 
precedent posed in the first instance by the very development 
of "new" rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry permits 
litigants to assert, and the courts to consider, the equitable 
and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly 
situated. 
Id. at 2445 and 2447. 
The impact of Beam on the federal doctrine of retroactivity is 
this: The U.S. Supreme Court may or may not apply the Chevron 
analysis in deciding the issue of retroactivity as to the litigants 
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themselves. But, it is error for other courts to apply the Chevron 
analysis to a case already decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.5 
C. BEAM MANDATES THAT OTHER COURTS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE 
THE RETROACTIVITY OP A U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION FOCUS THEIR 
INQUIRY ON THE OPINION ITSELF. 
Because the pivotal issue is how the Court applied the rule of 
a case to its litigants, other courts now must look to the opinion 
itself with their sole line of inquiry being, "Did the U.S. Supreme 
Court apply its rule retroactively to the litigants?" The rule 
applied to the litigants must be applied to all, and re-litigation 
of the retroactivity issue in other courts is error. 
D. UNDER THE BEAM ANALYSIS, A U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION IS 
RETROACTIVE TO ITS LITIGANTS AND THUS TO ALL OTHERS, IF 1) THE 
COURT APPLIED ITS DECISION RETROACTIVELY, OR 2) THE COURT 
ALLOWED CONSIDERATION OF REMEDIES, OR 3) THE COURT DID NOT 
RESERVE THE ISSUE OF RETROACTIVITY (SILENCE). 
In deciding Beam, the U.S. Supreme Court made no promise to 
specifically address the issue of retroactivity in all decisions. 
5
 Defendants analyze the opinion in Beam to conclude that 
at least four and possibly six U.S. Supreme Court Justices would 
still apply the Chevron analysis "in the proper case." Df bf pp. 
68-78, especially p. 74. Bvit the issue is not whether the U.S. 
Supreme Court will apply Chevron. The issue is whether other 
courts may apply Chevron to a case already decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The answer is no. To apply a different rule than 
that applied to the litigants is error. 
Defendants also conclude from the same analysis that "pure-
prospectivity" is not dead. Df bf pp. 68-78, especially p. 74. 
That is not the issue. The Beam decision casts no doubt on whether 
the Court, in the proper case, will continue to refuse 
retroactivity both to the litigants and to all others similarly 
situated (pure-prospectivity). The issue is whether "pure-
prospectivity" can apply to Davis. It cannot because the Court in 
Davis neither refused retroactive application to the litigants nor 
reserved the issue. Defendants are attempting to float on a "pure-
prospectivity" ship which has already sunk. 
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Indeed, the Court recognized that "[I]n most decisions of this 
Court, retroactivity both as to choice of law and as to remedy goes 
without saying." Beam at 2445. 
The Court in Bacchus did not address retroactivity. But in 
Beam, the Supreme Court of Georgia erred in failing to see that 
Bacchus followed the normal course of full retroactivity in civil 
cases. Beam at 2446. In so ruling, the Beam court analyzed 
important indicia of retroactivity. 
1. A case is retroactive if it applies its rule 
retroactively to its litigants. 
Bacchus was retroactively applied to its litigants so it was 
applied retroactively to Beam. 
2. A case is retroactive if the court allowed 
consideration of remedies. 
In the Beam court's view (while favorably citing Davis): 
Indeed, any consideration of remedial issues necessarily 
implies that the precedential question has been settled to the 
effect that the rule of law will apply to the parties before the 
Court. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at (slip op. 25-28) pass-
through defense considered as remedial question). Because the 
Court in Bacchus remanded the case solely for consideration of the 
pass-through defense, it thus should be read as having 
retroactively applied the rule there decided. See also Williams v. 
Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 28 (1985); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 
176, 196-197 (1983); cf. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of ^Treasury, 489 
U.S. 803, 817 (1989). (emphasis added). 
Id. at 2445, also 2448 [concurrence of J. White]; 2450 
[concurrence of J. Scalia, J. Marshall and J. Blackman]; [all cases 
are retroactive]; 2451 [Dissent by J. O'Connor, C.J. Rehnquist, J. 
Kennedy] (agreeing that Bacchus applied its rule retroactively). 
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3. A case is retroactive if the Court does not reserve 
the issue of retroactivity (silence). 
In the Court's view: 
. . . Bacchus is fairly read to hold as a choice of law that 
its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then 
before the Court. Because the Bacchus opinion did not reserve 
the question whether its holding should be applied to the 
parties before it, compare American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. 
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 297-298 (1987) (remanding case to 
consider whether ruling "should be applied retroactively and 
to decide other remedial issues"), it is properly understood 
to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application in 
civil cases. If the Court were to have found prospectivity as 
a choice-of-law matter, there would have been no need to 
consider the pass-through defense; if the Court had reserved 
the issue, the terms of the remand to consider "remedial" 
issues would have been incomplete. (emphasis added). 
Id. at 2445; also 2450, [concurrence of J. Scalia, J. 
Marshall, J. Blackman] (all civil cases are retroactive). 
On this test for retroactivity of a decision, even the dissent 
agreed: 
I agree that the Court in Bacchus applied its rule 
retroactively to the parties before it. The Bacchus opinion 
is silent on the retroactivity question. Given that the usual 
course in cases before this Court is to apply the rule 
announced to the parties in the case, the most reasonable 
reading of silence is that the Court followed its customary 
practice. (emphasis added)• 
Id. at 2451; [Dissent by J. O'Connor, C.J. Rehnquist, J. 
Kennedy (dissenting on selective retroactivity issue only)]. 
Ee APPLYING THE BEAM ANALYSIS, DAVIS WAS RETROACTIVE TO ITS 
LITIGANTS AND THUS TO ALL BECAUSE, 1) DAVIS RETROACTIVELY 
INVALIDATED THE MICHIGAN TAX IN PRIOR YEARS; 2) DAVIS ALLOWED 
ITS LITIGANTS TO CONSIDER REMEDIAL ISSUES; AND 3) DAVIS DID 
NOT RESERVE THE ISSUE OF ITS RETROACTIVITY (SILENCE) . 
1. Davis is retroactive because it applied its rule 
retroactively to invalidate the Michigan tax in prior 
years. 
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The Supreme Court's 1989 invalidation of Michigan's scheme in 
Davis applied to the years 1979-1984, the only years for which a 
refund was sought. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 160 Mich. 
App. 98, 408 N.W. 2d 433 (Mich. 1987). Retroactive invalidation of 
the tax law in these earlier years was the circumstance under which 
the state conceded a refund. (See Davis at 817). 
2. Davis is retroactive because it allowed its 
litigants to consider remedial issues. 
As the Court in Beara observed: 
[A]ny consideration of remedial issues necessarily implies 
that the precedential question has been settled to the effect 
that the rule of law will apply to the parties before the 
court. 
Beam at 2445. 
The parties in Davis did not stipulate to a refund. The State 
of Michigan "conceded that a refund is appropriate in these 
circumstances" if it was determined the state taxed Mr. Davis in 
violation of § 111. Davis at 817. (Emphasis added). Because the 
Court so determined, it invalidated the Michigan tax in prior years 
and accepted Michigan's concession regarding the appropriate remedy 
under state law. That the Court looked at all to the appropriate 
remedy, and allowed a refund to Mr. Davis, made Davis retroactive 
to its litigants. 
If there is any doubt on this issue, the Beam Court's citation 
to Davis as an analogous supporting authority should resolve the 
issue. 
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Because the Court in Bacchus remanded the case solely for 
consideration of the pass-through defense, it thus should be 
read as having retroactively applied the rule there decided. 
n2 See also Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 28 (1985); 
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196-197 (1983); cf. 
Davis v. Michigan Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989). 
(emphasis added)• 
Id. at 2445. This citation to Davis alone, joined in by J. Stevens 
(the sole dissenter in Davis) and unchallenged by any member of the 
Court, is irreconcilable with Defendants1 assertion that Davis is 
not retroactive. 
3. Davis is retroactive because it did not reserve the 
issue of retroactivity (silence)• 
Davis did not reserve the issue of retroactivity and, other 
than to allow a refund, was silent on the issue. A case which does 
not reserve the issue f,is properly understood to have followed the 
normal rule of retroactive application in civil cases". Beam at 
2445. "The most reasonable reading of silence is that the court 
followed its customary practice "of retroactive application". Id. 
at 2451 (dissent by O'Connor). Davis must be read to follow the 
normal course of retroactivity to its litigants and thus to all 
others. 
4. The U.S. Supreme Court views Beam to be applicable 
to Davis. 
If the Court's citation to Davis in Beam is not clear enough, 
any lingering doubt about Beam's applicability to Davis should have 
vanished on June 28, 1991, eight days after the Beam decision, when 
the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the South Carolina and 
Virginia federal retiree "Davis" cases for further consideration in 
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light of Beajn. Bass v. South Carolina, 395 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1990) 
cert, granted, vacated and remanded 111 S.Ct. 2881 (1991); Harper 
v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 401 S.E. 2d 868 (Vir. 1991) 
cert, granted, vacated and remanded, 111 S.Ct. 2881 (1991).6 
IV. THE PLAIN INTERPRETATION OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE DOES NOT 
RAISE AN ISSUE OF RETROACTIVITY (CHEVRON) . 
Even after Beam, Defendants argue the three prong test set 
forth in Chevron should be used to determine the retroactivity of 
Davis. Plaintiffs submit Beam is clear on the issue of federal 
retroactivity doctrine, but will respond to Defendants1 Chevron 
analysis below. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CHARACTERIZED DAVIS AS THE 
PLAIN READING OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE, § 111. 
Because the court announcing a decision is the ultimate 
authority on its retroactivity, the trial court appropriately 
analyzed the Davis opinion itself. Michigan argued in Davis that 
its taxation of federal retirees was justified by the reading of § 
111. The Supreme Court rejected Michigan's argument. "In our 
view, however, the plain language of the statxite dictates the 
opposite conclusion." Davis at 1808. The court continued: 
6
 Defendants quibble about the meaning of these remands. 
(Df bf p. 69, ftnt 25). However, generalized studies and 
statistics are meaningless because so many cases involve multiple 
issues and require additional factual determinations. The So. 
Carolina and Virginia cases presented a single issue: May a case 
applied retroactively to its litigants not be applied to others 
similarly situated? (answer: No) . The meaning of these remands 
is clear: Beam applies to Davis. 
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We have no difficulty concluding that civil service retirement 
benefits are deferred compensation for past years of service 
rendered to the government. 
Id. at 808. 
The Court called Michigan's interpretation of § 111 a 
"hypertechnical reading" of the statute. Id. at 809. "Any other 
interpretation . . .," said the Court, "would be implausible at 
best." Id. at 110. The court rejected Michiganfs attempts to 
argue the legislative history of § H I : 
The language of the statute leaves no room for doubt . . . 
legislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute... 
Id. at 809, ftnt 3. 
The Court found it "difficult to imagine" that Congress 
intended Michigan's interpretation of § 111 and emphasized: 
Nothing in the statutory language or even in the legislative 
history suggests this result . • • the overall meaning of § 
111 is unmistakable. 
Id. at 810. 
To Michigan's contention that federal retirees are not 
entitled to protection under the immunity doctrine, the court 
observed: 
[A]11 precedent is to the contrary • • . the state offers no 
reason for departing from this settled rule, and we decline to 
do so. 
Id. at 815. 
B. THE PLAIN INTERPRETATION OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE DOES 
NOT MEET THE "LAW CHANGING" THRESHOLD OF CHEVRON. 
A decision must be retroactive if it does not 
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establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear 
past precedent on which the litigants may have relied . . . or 
by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was 
not clearly foreshadowed . . . 
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106. 
In light of the Supreme Court's own characterization of Davis, 
Defendants have an impossible burden in showing that the U.S. 
Supreme Court would view its interpretation of § 111 as "law 
changing" or "unforeshadowed". A statute must foreshadow its own 
plain interpretation. Any contrary rule would raze the structure 
of statutory law. The U.S. Supreme Court does not apply its 
doctrine of non-retroactivity to the interpretation of plain and 
unambiguous statutes.7 West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 
111 S.Ct. 1138, 1147 (1991) "The sole function of the court is to 
enforce it [the statute] according to its terms"; Aloha Airlines, 
Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7 (1983) (invalidating a 
Hawaii tax on airlines, the Court said, "We acknowledge that our 
interpretation of § 1513(a) may result in disruption of state 
7
 It has no power to do so. For a court to suspend 
application of the plain meaning of an unambiguous federal statute 
for reasons other than its unconstitutionality would violate the 
separation of powers embodied in the Constitution, c.f.: Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 164-166, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). See also: 
William "Sky" King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 60 USLW 4061, Case 
No. 90-889 (decided December 16, 1991) in which the Court found 
itself not "free to tinker with the statutory scheme." 
Separation of power concerns do not arise when a court 
reverses its own interpretations of the Constitution or common law 
and then limits the effect of those decisions (non-retroactivity of 
common law and constitutional decisions allowed where no question 
of impairment of federal rights is involved). 
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systems of taxation; we are, however bound by the plain language of 
the statute." Id. at 14 n.10.). 
C. INTERPRETING A FEDERAL STATUTE IS A PAR DIFFERENT MATTER 
FROM INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION OR COMMON LAW. 
In ATA, supra at p. 13, the Court noted that the retroactivity 
of its decision interpreting a federal statute in Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) was a far different matter from 
deciding whether to give retroactive effect to its own case law 
decisions. ATA at 2334. 
In Owen, the Court construed the difficult § 1983 civil rights 
statute and rejected the municipalities reasonable but contrary 
interpretation. The Court emphasized that holding a municipality 
responsible for the foreseeable interpretation of a federal 
statute: 
. . . merely makes municipalities, like private individuals, 
responsible for anticipating developments in the law. We 
noted that such liability would motivate each of the cityfs 
elected officials to consider whether his decision compares 
with constitutional mandates and . . . weigh the risk that a 
violation might result in an award of damages from the public 
treasury. Id. at 556. This analysis does not apply when a 
decision breaks with precedent, a type of departure which, by 
definition, public officials could not anticipate nor have any 
responsibility to anticipate, [cite omitted, emphasis added]. 
ATA at 2334. 
Courts have found prospective-only decision making a useful 
tool for softening the sometimes harsh effects of changing 
constitutional fence lines. Because true boundaries of a 
constitution are not painted on the soil, courts forever seek them 
with new surveying instruments. But, a statute is a wall and the 
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rules of statutory construction have not changed substantially 
since Congress built its first walls. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never refused to give retroactive 
affect to the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. Never. 
D. BECAUSE DAVIS DID NOT MEET THE "LAW CHANGING" THRESHOLD 
OF THE CHEVRON ANALYSIS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED 
CONSIDERATION OF THE REMAINING TWO "PRONGS" OF CHEVRON. 
The trial court, citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S.Ct. 
3202 (1990), (hereafter "Ashland"), correctly viewed the "law 
changing", first "prong" of Chevron as "a threshold test which, if 
not met, will be dispositive of the issue" of retroactivity. 
Conclusions of Law, p. 19, R. 1137. In Ashland, West Virginia had 
imposed a gross receipts tax on out-of-state wholesalers while 
exempting local manufacturers. 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of Arjnco v. 
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984), which invalidated a similar tax. 
Because Armco was not "revolutionary," the first "prong" of Chevron 
was not satisfied. The first prong being a "threshold test," the 
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Court did not consider the last two elements of the Chevron test.8 
Ashland at 3205. 
Applying the policy and equity elements of the second and 
third "prongs" of the Chevron test to a decision which is not "law 
changing" is contrary to the whole purpose of federal non-
retroactivity doctrine. 
In those relatively rare circumstances where established 
precedent is overruled, the doctrine of non-retroactivity 
allows a court to adhere to past precedent in a limited number 
of cases, in order to avoid "jolting the expectations of 
parties to a transaction." (emphasis added). 
ATA at 2341. Quoting Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Riners Co., 
287 U.S. 352 (1932). 
8
 This limitation of non-retroactivity doctrine to 
precedent overruling cases in ATA and the Court's refusal to apply 
non-retroactivity in Ashland, supra, to a case which is not 
"revolutionary" is evidence of a narrowing of the scope and use of 
the non-retroactivity doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court. Once 
used widely and almost exclusively in criminal procedure issues 
(see Summary and Discussion in Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 
1983), the Court has practically abandoned the practice since 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), mandated the application 
of new rules of criminal procedure to all other cases or direct 
review and not yet final. A like narrowing in the civil context is 
best illustrated by the ATA decision. When the U.S. Supreme Court 
in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), 
reversed its own line of cases going back more than fifty years, it 
invalidated an Arkansas highway use tax valid under prior law. 
Arguments of the State's reliance in ATA were compelling. Even so, 
the court was badly split on the issue of retroactivity. Four 
justices (dissenting) would never issue a prospective-only 
decision; four (the plurality) thought the case should be 
prospective-only and one (concurring) was against retroactive 
application only because he believed the earlier line of cases was 
still good law. He, however, noted that "prospective-only" 
decision making had no justification outside commerce clause 
decisions. Thus, a majority of the ATA court would apply all non-
commerce clause decisions (e.g. Davis) retroactively. 
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Justice White in Beam, explained that the Chevron test is "not 
implicated" where the court thinks its decision is 
"reasonably foreseeable and hence not a new rule." Beam at 2448 
(Concurring Opinion of J. White). 
Analysis of the second and third prongs of Chevron also 
suggests that the "law changing" threshold of the first prong is 
determinative of the other two. When a new decision reverses prior 
cases on which reliance was expected, reliance and policy arguments 
are compelling and strongly favor application of the prior law. 
Conversely, when, as in Davis, the opinion merely declares the 
plain meaning of an unambiguous statutes, the policy factors weigh 
heavily in favor of giving effect to the statute from its 
enactment. In such a situation the party resisting retroactivity 
can find no compelling reliance arguments ("others did it too", 
"the court was wrong", "we didn't know the law", or "it's just too 
expensive," are the only available arguments). 
What policy, equitable consideration, or rule of law, allows 
a state to ignore a federal statute with impunity until some court 
finally interprets its plain meaning? As the ATA court explained 
its own unanimous ruling in McKesson Corp. v. JDiv. of Alcoholic 
Beverages and Tobacco, 110 S.Ct. 2238 (1990) (hereafter 
"McKesson"): 
Where a state can easily foresee the invalidation of its tax 
statutes its reliance interests may merit little concern, see 
McKesson, 110 S.Ct., at 2254-2255, 2257. 
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ATA at 2333. The trial court correctly found the "law changing" 
test of Chevron to be a threshold test. 
E. CONSIDERATION OF THE SECOND AND THIRD PRONGS OF 
CHEVRON WOULD HAVE SHOWN COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE 
RETROACTIVITY OF DAVIS. 
The trial court granted Plaintiffs1 motion to strike the 
affidavits submitted by Defendants dealing with the second and 
third prongs of Chevron because they were irrelevant. R. 1114. 
Nonetheless, Defendants argue the allegations contained in the 
stricken affidavits, Df bf pp. 63-64, as though they are 
uncontested and presumed to be true.9 If the last two prongs of 
Chevron had been considered by the trial court, they would have 
heavily favored the taxpayers. 
1. Retroactive application of Davis will further 
the policy of intergovernmental tax immunity. 
In Davis related litigation, the Arkansas State Supreme Court 
upheld the awarding of refunds to federal retirees in a class 
action suit. Pledger v. Bosnick, 811 S.W.2d 286 (Ark. 1991). 
After finding that Davis did not establish a new principle of law, 
the court stated with regard to the second prong of Chevron: 
'Plaintiffs have maintained from the outset that Davis was 
retroactive and therefore the Chevron analysis was improper. When 
the trial court agreed and granted the motion to strike the 
affidavits submitted by Defendants, Plaintiffs did not need to 
present any evidence contesting the affidavits. Should this court 
determine the trial court erred in striking Defendants' affidavits, 
the proper course on remand would be to allow Plaintiffs the 
opportunity to present evidence regarding hardship to members of 
the class and regarding the second and third prongs of Chevron. 
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Obviously retroactive application will advance the doctrine 
for the members of this class. Also, a refusal to apply the 
doctrine in this case may retard the recognition of it in 
other matters which come before the Arkansas legislature which 
might fall under the scope of the doctrine. 
Pledger at 293. 
In Montana, where the State Supreme Court found Davis to be 
nonretroactive under Chevron, the dissent observed: 
...the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity can only be 
furthered by the retroactive application of Davis. Refusing 
to apply Davis retroactively means that this Court has 
condoned the Statefs total disregard for the plain language of 
4 U.S.C. § 111 and is akin to a continuation of past 
discrimination. Such a result does not further and, indeed, 
retards the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity in that 
it does not tend to deter future State violations of the 
doctrine. 
Sheehy v. Montana, No. 90-450 (Mont. Nov. 14, 1991), p. 21. 
Applying Davis retroactively will send a message to the 
legislature that discrimination in areas of intergovernmental 
taxation is not permissible. 
2. The equities in this case favor retroactive 
application of Davis. 
In finding that the equities weighed in favor of the class of 
Plaintiffs, the Arkansas Supreme Court found: 
No doubt the State of Arkansas will suffer financial loss by 
making a refund to the members of this class who follow the 
procedures for such refund. However, the third prong of 
Chevron requires that the decision be applied retroactively 
unless a substantial inequitable result will occur as a result 
of the decision. If inequitable results occur whether 
retroactivity is applied or not, we must make the ruling 
retroactive. Our decision in this case itself does not create 
the hardship. It will exist regardless of the outcome of this 
case. Clearly if the members of this class are not given the 
relief they have prayed for, they will be treated inequitably 
in that they will have paid an unconstitutional tax. Someone 
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here will suffer, either the state or the taxpayers. We are 
not simply picking the class for refund based on need, nor are 
we penalizing the state. We are determining that since one of 
two inequitable results must occur, we are required to apply 
the ruling retroactively. 
Pledger at 293. 
The two dissents in Montana pointed out the obvious 
inconsistencies in the majorities logic: 
It is true, as the majority states, that refunds to 
federal retirees would result in a financial burden on the 
other taxpayers of the State; it also is true, however, that 
those taxpayers have benefitted greatly from the federal 
retirees1 overpayment of taxes over many years. In any event, 
the state's and taxpayers1 exposure to the disruptive impact 
of the tax scheme's invalidation is limited because of the 
five-year statute of limitations. 
* * * 
Finally, it must be recognized that, notwithstanding the 
financial impact to the State, substantial inequities have 
been wrought upon the federal retirees over a period of many 
years. Retirees who paid the discriminatory tax and have 
since left Montana or died would receive no remedy even under 
a proper resolution of this case. Others would receive back 
only a small portion of the discriminatory taxes they paid, no 
matter what remedy might be fashioned, because of the 
applicable statue of limitations. How the majority can 
conclude that the Chevron "equities" prong favors the State, 
as opposed to the federal retirees who were wrongfully 
discriminated against by the State, is simply beyond my 
understanding. 
Sheehy v. Montana, supra, p. 22. 
As far as I am concerned, the issue involved in this case 
is a simple one. The State took the petitioners' money 
illegally. That fact is obvious from the plain language of § 
111. If a private citizen took someone's money illegally, he 
or she would be forced to give it back. The State ought to do 
the same. 
The majority talks about equity. What is equitable about 
allowing the State, with all its power, to illegally seize 
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someone's property, and then after being told what it did was 
illegal, allowing the State to keep it? 
* * * 
The majority's decision is clearly a result-oriented 
decision arrived at for the purpose of protecting the State's 
coffers. However, the State's coffers are not the 
responsibility of this Court. The rights of this State's 
citizens are. 
Sheehy v. Montana, supra, pp 30-31. 
Under either Beam or the first prong of Chevron, Davis is 
retroactive. However, even an analysis of the equities favors 
retroactive application of Davis. 
F. THE ATA DECISION DOES MOT SUPPORT DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT 
DAVIS IS RETROACTIVE, 
Defendants argue that ATA supports their retroactivity 
analysis because it confirms the Chevron analysis. Df bf pp. 65-
68. Even ignoring Beam, Defendants' reliance on ATA is misplaced. 
ATA involved the Court's ever-evolving struggle with the commerce 
clause.10 Its application outside the commerce clause is limited. 
However, ATA does illustrate the narrow scope of the federal civil 
retroactivity doctrine. 
That the court would hesitate to give prospective treatment to 
a decision reversing fifty years of prior case law further explains 
10
 It is not surprising that the civil retroactivity cases 
relied on by Defendants are, like virtually all civil cases with 
retroactivity issues, commerce clause cases. The ATA court itself 
was careful to distinguish its policy considerations in 
interpreting the Constitution from those of interpreting a federal 
statute. 
-32-
its refusal three weeks after ATA, to apply non-retroactivity to 
Ashland, supra. 
V. DEPENDANTS1 ARGUMENTS DO NOT MAKE DAVIS RETROACTIVE. 
A. THE REAL SURPRISE TO UTAH OFFICIALS IS THE EXISTENCE OF 
§ 111, NOT ITS MEANING. 
No recent Utah official seems to have ever seen or read § 111 
until the Davis decision.11 Because Utah is charged with knowledge 
of the law, Defendants are in the position of arguing that they 
would not have thought § 111 applicable to federal retirees even if 
they had seen it. 
B. DEFENDANTS* CRITICISM OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IS 
IRONIC. 
Of necessity, Defendants criticize the U.S. Supreme Court's 
view of § 111 as an unambiguous statute with a plain meaning and 
fault the Courtfs reasoning in an attempt to characterize Davis as 
law reversing. Df bf pp. 52-60. The irony of these arguments is 
that the U.S. Supreme Court itself is the ultimate authority on the 
foreseeability of its own decision. See ATA at 2330. 
C. DEFENDANTS MISINTERPRET S 111 AND CALL DAVIS A NEW LAW 
BECAUSE THEY DENY THAT FEDERAL RETIREMENT PAY IS "PAY OR 
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICE AS AN OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF 
THE UNITED STATES". 
Defendants1 argument that retirement pay is not deferred 
compensation for prior service is without merit and illustrates the 
path Defendants must take to call Davis new law. 
11
 Deposition of Richard Hansen, Chairmen, Utah State Tax 
Commission, R. 1159 at p. 23; Deposition of Roger Tew, Tax 
Commissioner, R. 1163 at pp. 13-14. 
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Federal retirement benefits are, and always have been, 
"deferred wages." See e.g. 59 cong. Rec 6300 (April 29, 1920), 
(Statement of Rep. Hamill: "Pension are not gratuities, and they 
should not be considered as such. They should be looked upon as 
deferred wages — as payment of wages which were not disbursed at 
the time when they were earned.") See also Kizas v. Webster, 707 
F.2d 524, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984). 
Defendants' claim of surprise12 is puzzling in view of their 
contrary position in Fitzpatrick v. State Tax Commission, 386 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1963), in which the Commission prevailed in 
characterizing private Retirement benefits as deferred 
compensation.13 (What else could they be, argued the Commission, 
12
 Defendants do not identify any prior precedent to the 
contrary. Instead, they criticize the Supreme Court's citation to 
its own precedent because "those cases did not discuss § 111." Df 
bf p. 53. This illustrates the narrowness of Defendants' 
reasoning. Because Davis is the first case interpreting § 111, 
they see no reason Utah should be held responsible to interpret and 
comply with the statute prior to 1989. 
13
 Defendants attempt to distinguish their position in 
Fitzpatrick by arguing that private retirement benefits are 
deferred compensation, but public retirement benefits are not. Df 
bf p. 54, ftnt 14. As the trial court noted: 
In the Court's view, this is a distinction without a 
difference. That federal employees pay or compensation may 
arise from a statutory enactment does not destroy the nexus 
between retirement pay and the employees previous service with 
the federal government. Most federal retirees would be 
justifiably offended at the States' view of their retirement 
pay, earned over many years of faithful service to the United 
States Government, as an unearned statutory entitlement. 
Conclusions of Law, R. 1128. 
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since the taxpayer invested no capital to purchase them?). Id. at 
897. 
Now, twenty-seven (27) years later, Defendants call the same 
characterization in Davis "unforeseeable", "a new rule of law". 
Defendants1 claim of "surprise" that federal retirement benefits 
are deferred compensation from federal employment is unbelievable. 
Defendants1 argument also ignores this Court's holding which, 
consistent with virtually all others, recognizes that federal 
retirement benefits "derive from employment" and "are a form of 
deferred compensation by the employer." Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431, 432 (1982). 
D. DEFENDANTS MISINTERPRET 5 H I AND CALL DAVIS "NEW LAW91 
BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO SEE § H I AS A STATUTORY LIMITED WAIVER 
OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY. 
The legal disagreements between the parties have their origin 
in Defendants1 fundamental failure to see the connection between § 
111 and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. In 
Defendantsf words: 
This connection between § 111 and the intergovernmental tax 
immunity clause was determined for the first time in Davis and 
was neither dictated nor foreshadowed by prior precedent. 
Df bf p. 56.u Defendants1 position is incredible. In applying 
intergovernmental immunity principles to resolve the issue of a 
14
 Contrast this with the Arkansas Supreme Court• s statement 
in Davis related litigation: "A review of the extensive historical 
discussion in Davis will clearly show that the Doctrine of 
Intergovernmental Immunity has been applied for decades." Pledger 
v. Bosnick, 811 S.W. 2d 287, 297 (Ark. 1991). 
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state's taxation of federal employees, the U.S. Supreme Court 
expressly relied on a long line of cases. 
Reference to intergovernmental immunity principles is not just 
helpful in understanding § ill, these principles are the essence of 
the statute; a limited waiver of immunity is its very purpose and 
its plain meaning. 
Defendants argue for a "traditional equal protection analysis" 
of Utah's discriminatory taxation of federal employees. Df bf p. 
55. Defendants use this to justify their unlawful taxation by 
alleging their "rational basis" for so doing.15 
If the United States and its former employees are immune from 
taxation, no amount of good faith or rational reasons can rend the 
immunity wall. Only the United States can waive its own immunity 
as it did in § lllf and then only in its own terms, i.e., that the 
tax not discriminate. As the Court noted: 
15
 Defendants' citations to state taxation cases decided 
under equal protection are not helpful. See Df bf pp. 42, 43 and 
55. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) , 
appropriately applied equal protection analysis to uphold an ad 
valorem personal property tax which discriminated between 
individuals and business entities; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 
301 U.S. 495 (1937) , appropriately applied €*qual protection 
analysis to uphold a state unemployment tax which certain classes 
of employers including all government entities. Neither of these 
cases involved levied on federal agencies or their 
instrumentalities. 
Huckuba v. Johnson, 573 P.2d 305 (Or. 1977), (cited p. 42, 
ftnt 7), affirmed Oregon's practice of giving preferential tax 
treatment to retirees over a certain age. This is not 
discrimination on the basis of the "source of income" prohibited by 
§ 111. The two New Jersey tax cases cited in the same footnote 
uphold the taxing of private annuities while exempting public 
annuities. This is also irrelevant. 
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The State's interest in adopting the discriminatory tax, no 
matter how substantial, is simply irrelevant to an inquiry 
into the nature of the two classes receiving inconsistent 
treatment. 
Davis at 816. 
The Davis Court interpreted S 111 just as it reads: to 
prohibit "discrimination11.16 The only possible justification 
Michigan could have in discriminating between state and federal 
employees is if they were not similarly situated, i.e., if 
"significant differences" existed between the two classes.17 Davis 
at 816. The only difference between federal retirees and state 
retirees in the matter of taxation was the source of the 
compensation. This was an express violation of the plain reading 
of § 111. 
Now, Utah makes the same argument Michigan made and tries to 
characterize Davis as a reversal of prior law, as "unforeshadowed." 
Df bf p. 51. But, the Court's refusal to allow a breach in the 
16
 "Discrimination" is the disparate treatment of similarly 
situated classes. See: BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, p. 553 (4th Ed. 
1968) . 
17
 Defendants further confuse the retroactivity issue by 
their reliance on Teague v. Lane, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989), the 
dissent in Milton v. Nainwright, 407 U.S. 371 and United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), for the proposition that a case which 
disrupts a widely accepted practice is not retroactive. Df bf pp. 
49-50. These are criminal cases dealing with revolutionary new 
criminal rules which contradicted prior decisions. Their 
considerations do not exist in the civil context and never became 
part of the Chevron analysis. In criminal cases, the prospective 
or retroactive effect of decisions involve a wide range of 
considerations. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, (Utah 1984). 
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wall of federal sovereign immunity because a state has a rational 
basis for discriminatory taxation is not new law. 
E. DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF RELIANCE ON THE PRACTICE OF OTHER 
STATES DOES NOT MAKE DAVIS RETROACTIVE. 
Defendants lean heavily on Utah's reliance18 on the practice 
of twenty-two other states who taxed federal retirees while 
exempting their own retirees. Defendants contend that Davis was a 
new rule of law because Davis interrupted this "practice". This 
prior practice, contends Utah, was the "prior law". Df bf pp. 50 
and 62. 
But, Defendants confuse the challenged practice with 
decisional law. Davis declared this practice to violate federal 
law. The prior law by which the practice was tested was § 111 
which had not changed since its enactment in 1939. Defendants 
mistake the law changing issue when they claim that twenty-two 
other legislatives created prior law. The issue is: Did Davis 
change federal law in its interpretation of § 111? The answer is: 
It did not. It applied basic statutory interpretation rules older 
than § 111 itself, rules which are followed by the courts of all 
fifty states. 
18
 "Reliance" is used loosely. Utah enacted the exemption 
for its own retirees in 1947 (Utah Laws 1947 C. 131, § 13). Other 
states appear to have followed Utah. (See, e.g., New Mexico NMSA 
§ 10-11-145 enacted in 1953; Virginia (Code of Va. § 51-111.15 
enacted in 1952); Missouri (Mo. Statutes § 104.540 enacted in 
1957). A review of the federal retiree litigation in the various 
states shows it to be a common theme for each state to argue "the 
others violated § 111 first". 
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State legislatures do not have the power to override 
congressional legislation. See: Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage 
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-332 (1964); Capital Cities Cable, 
Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984). Reliance on state legislation 
without one interpreting decision19 (did the other states, like 
Utah, simply not see § 111?) to contradict a plain unambiguous 
federal statute is manifestly unreasonable reliance. As the trial 
court observed, 
Defendants do not claim to have relied on their own contrary 
reading of § 111. Indeed, the real surprise to the State 
seems to have been the existence of § 111, not its 
interpretation. Reliance on the practice of twenty-two other 
states, if indeed Utah did so rely, is not the type of 
reliance protected by the federal retroactivity doctrine. No 
person and no government can be excused by ignorance of the 
law, even widespread ignorance. 
Conclusions of Law, pp. 18-19, R. 1136, 1137. 
VI. HOLDING DAVIS TO BE RETROACTIVE WOULD NOT RELIEVE THE COURT OF 
ITS DUTY TO CONSTRUE 5 H I UNDER PRIOR LAW. 
Retroactivity is a rule of "stare decisis11 only. The U.S. 
Supreme Court stated in ATA: 
When the Court concludes that a law-changing decision should 
not be applied retroactively . . . [l]ower courts considering 
the applicability of the new decision to pending cases are 
then instructed as follows: If the operative conduct or 
events occurred before the law-changing decision, a court 
should apply the law prevailing at the time of the conduct. 
1V
 Defendants stand on sand compared to the litigants in 
Beam, who thought they could stand on the rock of a prior decision 
from their own Georgia Supreme Court declaring their tax to be 
legal. See: Beajn v. Georgia, 382 S.E. 2d 95, 97 (Ga. 1989). 
Still, the U.S. Supreme Court's invalidation of their tax was 
retroactive. 
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Id. at 2338. 
Defendants point to the practice of twenty-two other states in 
taxing federal retirees while exempting state retirees as the 
"prior law". However, the practice of the states is not relevant 
to the legal interpretation of § 111, a statute which Davis held to 
be plain and unambiguous.20 
Even without the precedential effect of Davis, the trial court 
would not have been relieved of its duty to interpret § 111. Thus, 
the trial court did interpret Davis, and concluded that its plain 
meaning invalidated Utah's taxing scheme. See: Conclusions of 
Law, pp. 9-11, R. 1127-1129. 
VII. UTAH'S SPECIFIC STATUTORY REMEDY FOR INCOME TAX REFUNDS IS 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPER REMEDY. 
A. UTAH HAS ADOPTED A REMEDY FOR INCOME TAX REFUNDS 
PATTERNED AFTER THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM. 
"An honorable government would not keep taxes to which it is 
not entitled, and the legislative scheme supports that result." 
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal v. Dept. of Rev., 776 P.2d 1061 (Ariz. 
1989). Utah, like Arizona, has also adopted a legislative scheme 
which mandates refunds of takes which the state has collected and 
to which it is not entitled. 
20
 Defendants1 claim of "a strong basis for reliance" on 
Christensen v. Tax Commission, 591 P. 2d 445 (Utah 1979) is 
misplaced. Df bf p. 41. The case addressed the distinction 
between an exemption and a deduction in light of Utah's exemption 
of state retirement income. By no stretch of the imagination was 
the Court presented with a challenge to the legality of the tax 
scheme under federal law. 
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When Utah adopted an individual income tax in 1931 (Laws of 
Utah 1931, Ch. 44) , it followed much of the federal income tax 
system and continued to amend its law to keep pace with changes in 
the federal tax system. (See: Backman, Utah's Proposed Federally-
Based Income Tax Act, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 493). 
In 1970, Utah amended its constitution to allow full 
incorporation by reference of federal tax law and procedure into 
Utah tax law, a procedure now followed by almost all states. Utah 
Constitution, Art. XIII § 12. This full incorporation was 
accomplished by the Utah Individual Income Tax Act of 1973, now 
U.C.A. § 59-10-101 et. seq.21 Among the provisions of the new Act 
was a remedy for "refund of overpayments", patterned after federal 
tax law. U.C.A. § 59-10-529 (as amended 1973). See Addendum 
Exhibit 4. Compare with I.R.C. § 6511 (1954 Code as amended). 
Utahfs income tax refund statute provides for refund of any 
"overpayment" of income taxes upon the filing of a return or 
claim22 within three years of the due date of the return: 
21
 The result of this simplification is that the State is 
"piggybacked" onto the federal system and the Utah Tax Commission 
handles "very few" state income tax matters. (Deposition of Jerry 
Larrabee, Appeals Supervisor, Utah State Tax Commission, R. 1161, 
p. 8). 
22
 The Commission designed a special form for use by federal 
retirees in this case. See: Exh. 2. The purpose of this form was 
to protect the rights of class members without requiring the 
expense and trouble of an amended return before determination of 
the legal issues in this appeal. 
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(1) In cases where there has been an overpayment of any tax 
imposed by this chapter . . . 
* * * 
(6) Any balance shall be refunded immediately to the 
taxpayer. 
U.C.A. § 59-10-529(1) and (6) .23 
This statutory remedy is the clear legislative scheme for 
refunds of all income taxes. It should be enforced. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has said: 
It certainly would be a delusion to require a taxpayer to pay 
the tax, seek a review, and if he prevails, not allow him to 
get it back. The most elemental principles of justice dictate 
the implication that if he pays the tax and follows the 
procedure set out in the Sales Tax Act, and is sustained in 
his contention that the tax is unlawful, it must be refunded. 
(emphasis added). 
Pacific Intermountain Express v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 
15, 315 P.2d 549, 552 (1957). 
B. DEFENDANTS DO NOT DENY THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE COMPLIED WITH 
THE REFUND PROVISIONS OF § 59-10-529 OR THAT ITS REMEDY 
APPLIES TO PLAINTIFFS, YET THEY RAISE AN OLD PROTEST REMEDY AS 
PLAINTIFFS' SOLE REMEDY. 
Defendants do not deny Plaintiffs1 compliance with the income 
tax refund statute, U.C.A. § 59-10-529, either by the individual 
members of the class who filed 55,000 claims, R. 606, or by class 
representatives who filed class claims for refund on behalf of the 
class. R. 456-463, 593. When answering Plaintiffs1 Amended 
The full text of § 59-10-529 is included at Addendum Exh. 
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Complaint, Defendants admitted class representatives filed claims 
in behalf of the class.24 
Neither do Defendants deny that the income tax refund remedy 
(§ 529) applies to Plaintiffs1 federal retiree claims. To the 
contrary, every public communication from the Commission has urged 
federal retirees to protect their rights to refunds under § 529. 
R. 130, 916-934. For this purpose, the Commission designed and 
circulated a special simplified claim form used by thousands of 
federal retirees and by the class to "protect their rights" in the 
event Utah's law was invalidated by the courts. R. 1163, p. 26, R. 
593. See Addendum Exh. 2. In announcing its simplified form, the 
Commission reminded retirees of the three year claim period of the 
refund statute. (Tax Bulletin 2/90, R. 930, Addendum Exh. 3; see 
also Conclusions of Law, R. 1131). When it appeared that many 
retirees had missed the three year period for refunds of their 1985 
taxes under § 529 because of confusion as to their rights and 
remedies (some even filed claims for a refund on napkins, which the 
Commission accepted. R. 1163, p. 26), the Utah Legislature, with 
encouragement from the Commission, extended the 1985 claim period 
to April 16, 1990. 1990 Utah Laws, Ch. 21 §§ 1 to 3, effective 
24
 Plaintiffs alleged in paragraph 16 of their Amended 
Complaint: "Plaintiffs have filed claims for tax refunds with 
Defendants on behalf of the Plaintiffs and all others similarly 
situated for the years 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988." Defendants 
admitted this allegation. R. 88, 257. 
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February 21, 1990.25 This Act had the express purpose of extending 
the three year limit for claims under § 59-10-529(7) for the 1985 
tax year to allow Plaintiffs "access to the refund adjudication 
process." Id. Therefore, Defendants claim that the protest 
statute is Plaintiffs' sole remedy contradicts the views of the 
legislature and the Commission. 
Even the Commission's continuing insistence on its 
jurisdiction to decide refund claims under § 529 testifies of its 
clear application to Plaintiffs. "The administrative remedies 
provided at U.C.A. § 59-10-531 through 535 are complete, adequate 
and speedy". Df bf p. 31. Undaunted, Defendants still assert the 
payment under protest provisions of the old protest statute (§ 59-
1-301) found among the miscellaneous sections of tax code to be 
Plaintiffs' sole remedy, with its six month limitation for tax paid 
under protest (§ 78-12-31). Df bf pp. 25-26. 
25
 The full text of the law reads: 
"Notwithstanding the general provisions of Subsection 59-10-
529(7), the filing deadline for persons claiming personal income 
tax refunds for tax year 1985 based on the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 109 S.Ct. 1500 
(March 28, 1989), is extended to April 16, 1990. 
This act addresses only questions of access to the refund 
adjudication process caused by the timing of the Davis v. Michigan 
decision. It does not affect the merits of any pending or future 
refund litigation. 
In enacting this law, the Legislature does not waive any legal 
right, claim, or defense of the state, its officers, or its 
employees; nor does the Legislature acknowledge or admit any legal 
obligation or liability in connection with the pending or future 
appeals or litigation arising from the decision in Davis v. 
Michigan. 
Laws 1990, Ch. 21. (emphasis added). 
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C. PR0TEST8 ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR REFUNDS OF INCOME TAX 
"OVERPAYMENTS". 
With its incorporation of federal tax law and procedure26, 
Utah has adopted a system which rejected a protest requirement for 
income taxes more than sixty years ago. In Moore Ice Cream Co. v. 
Rose, 289 U.S. 373 (1933), after the federal government repealed 
the law requiring payments under protest, litigation ensued 
regarding the date the law became effective. With reference to the 
protest requirement the U.S. Supreme Court said, 
In this situation the Government was unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the taxpayer when it held onto monies that had been 
illegally collected, whether with protest or without. So at 
least the lawmakers believed, and gave expression to that 
belief, not only in the statute, but in Congressional reports. 
Senate Report, No. 398, 68th Congress, First Session, pp. 44, 
45;27 
26
 Incorporation of federal tax law and procedure has the 
express purpose to "conform to the extent practicable, certain of 
the existing rules of procedure under and for the administration of 
Utah's individual income tax law to corresponding rules of 
administration and procedure described by federal income tax laws, 
with a view to the reduction of effect, promotion of better 
understanding of requirements and a greater consistency between 
state and federal procedures and administration.11 U.C.A. § 59-10-
102 (emphasis added). See also: Christensen v. State Tax 
Commission, 591 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah 1979) (the main purpose of 
incorporating federal income tax law into Utah law is to make the 
forms and procedures consistent). 
27
 "The U.S. Senate Report contained the following: 
Section 1114. The provisions of Section 1318 of existing law 
have been amended to provide that after the enactment of the bill 
it shall not be a condition precedent to the maintenance of a suit 
to recover taxes, sums or penalties paid, that such amounts shall 
have been paid under protest or duress. The fact protest was made 
has little bearing on the question whether the tax was properly or 
erroneously assessed. The making of such a protest becomes a 
formality so far as well advised taxpayers are concerned and the 
requirement of it may operate to deny the just claim of a taxpayer 
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Id. at 378. 
Commenting on how the new law repealing the protest 
requirement corrected what the court felt to be a serious 
injustice, the Court said: 
A high-minded Government renounced an advantage that was felt 
to be ignoble, and set up a new standard of equity and 
conscience. There was no thought to discriminate between 
payments made and those to come. A fine sense of honor had 
brought the statute into being. We are to read it in a 
kindred spirit. 
Id. at 379. 
The Arizona Supreme Court similarly rejects a rule requiring 
a protest for the recovery of tax refunds. 
We know of no good purpose served by such a rule. It is 
argued that the "under protest" requirement puts the taxing 
authority on notice that it might not be able to keep the tax, 
and therefore, it could hold the tax and not spend it until 
the matter is ultimately determined. But in this case, the 
state has conceded that this abstract reason for the rule does 
not apply. The state has not relied on these tax payments to 
its detriment. 
Moreover, the rule would promote a senseless practice. All 
taxpayers would be advised to pay all taxes "under protest" 
just to cover themselves. It is not likely that the state or 
any other taxing entity would hold all such taxes in abeyance 
pending future resolution. 
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal v. Dept. of Rev., 776 P.2d 1061, 1063 
(Ariz. 1989). 
The protest rule especially makes no sense in the payment of 
income taxes. Because almost all taxes are collected by 
withholding, the employee probably never knows when the tax is 
who was not well informed." Moore Ice Cream at 378. 
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submitted. To whom should a protest be made and how often? Who 
would note the protest among millions of computer-processed 
returns? This is not the case where a taxpayer delivers a check to 
a revenue agent along with a letter of protest and then waits for 
a phone call from the local tax authority. 
Federal tax law resolved the protest issue long ago; Utah was 
well advised when it incorporated the federal system. 
D. REFUNDS OF INCOME TAX "OVERPAYMENTS1' UNDER 5 59-10-529 
INCLUDE TAXES UNLAWFULLY COLLECTED. 
With its statutory incorporation of federal income tax 
definitions and procedures, Utah incorporates the federal 
definition of "overpayment".28 The federal definition of the word 
"overpayment" was at issue in Jones v. Liberty Glass Company, 332 
U.S. 524 (1948) , when a taxpayer brought suit to recover a payment 
of income tax alleged to have been illegally assessed. The U.S. 
Supreme Court defined tax "overpayment" to include those tax 
payments made as a result of error in law: 
In the absence of some contrary indication, we must assume 
that the framers of these statutory provisions intended to 
convey the ordinary meaning which is attached to the language 
they used. See Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658, 661, 
89 L.Ed. 535, 539, 65 S.Ct. 536. Hence we read the word 
"overpayment" in its usual sense, as meaning any payment in 
excess of that which is properly due. Such an excess payment 
may be traced to an error in mathematics or in judgment or in 
interpretation of facts or law. And the error may be 
committed by the taxpayer or by the revenue agents. Whatever 
28
 "Any term used in this chapter has the same meaning as 
when used in comparable context in the laws of the United States 
relating to federal income taxes unless a different meaning is 
clearly required." U.C.A. § 59-10-103(2). 
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the reason, the payment of more than is rightfully due is what 
characterizes an overpayment. (emphasis added). 
Liberty Glass at 531. 
The holding of Liberty Glass is codified in I.R.C. § 6401(c) 
(1954 Code) . The Utah counterpart reads: "If there is no tax 
liability for a period in which an amount is paid as income tax, 
the amount is an overpayment." U.C.A. § 59-10-529(12). 
Under any characterization, retroactive invalidation of Utahfs 
tax on federal retirees for the years 1985-1988 is a ruling on tax 
liability. See: Conclusions of Law, R. 1131, 1132, pp. 13-14. 
The Commission recognizes the breadth of the "overpayment" 
definition and treats as an overpayment any amount not properly 
due. An overpayment is simply a mathematical calculation between 
what the taxpayer paid and what he should have paid. Depo. of 
Commission Chairman Richard Hansen, R. 1159, pp. 21-22. "I donft 
know that it (the definition of overpayment) would even be an 
issue." Id. at 22. Commissioner Roger Tew agrees that the reasons 
for the overpayment are irrelevant. 
[I]t really has been a non-issue. . . the term "overpayment" 
is probably generic and that's how we have approached that. 
If you were entitled to a refund of your ultimate tax 
liability, it is established to be less than the amount that 
you paid in, we entered the provisions for a refund decision, 
but. . . I am unaware of any case that we have had before us 
where that has ever been raised as an issue. . . in the income 
tax area. 
Depo. of Roger Tew, Tax Commissioner, R. 1163, p. 28. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado recently decided its federal 
retiree refund case by ordering refunds. When asked to avoid the 
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statutory remedy for refunds of income tax overpayments, the Court 
refused: 
The plain reading, and only reasonable interpretation, of [the 
refund statutes] is that the General Assembly intended to 
refund any tax illegally collected under U.C.A. § 39-22-
104(4)(g) to the affected taxpayers. Faced with such plain 
legislative intent, it is both unnecessary and outside our 
judicial role to look to whether refunds are good policy or 
whether a balancing test, such as Chevron, favors retroactive 
or prospective application of our holding that U.C.A. § 39-22-
104(4)(g) was unconstitutional. 
Kuhn v. State Dept. of Revenue, 817 P.2d 101, 110 (Colo. 1991). 
E. UNDER UTAH LAW, THE PROTEST REMEDY HAS NO APPLICATION 
WHERE A MORE SPECIFIC STATUTORY REMEDY EXISTS AND AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IS ESTABLISHED. 
Defendants1 view of the protest statute as Plaintiffs1 sole 
remedy is contrary to the holding and position taken by the 
Commission in Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957). There, the taxpayer 
paid allegedly unlawful sales taxes under protest and filed an 
action directly in district court in reliance on the protest 
statute, U.C.A. § 59-11-11 (1953) (now renumbered at U.C.A. § 59-1-
301) . The Commission moved to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, raising the more specific sales tax remedy to be Plaintiffs' 
exclusive remedy. The trial court agreed and dismissed the protest 
complaint; the Utah Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. 
In its opinion, the Court compared the protest and sales tax 
remedies. 
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It is to be noted that U.C.A. § 59-11-1129 is of ancient 
origin. It has existed in our law since statehood, and sets 
out the historical method of contesting payment of taxes. It 
is general in its terms; has usually been applied to disputes 
over property taxes and is found in the "miscellaneous" 
provision of the tax code. On the other hand, § 59-15-12 to 
15, upon which the Tax Commission relied, are of more recent 
origin, being part of the Sales Tax Act itself which was 
enacted in 1933; and are explicit as to the manner in which a 
taxpayer dissatisfied with a sales tax assessment may 
challenge it. 
Id. at 551. 
The Commission correctly argued that the more specific sales 
tax act must control over the general protest remedy. 
. . . supporting this view are the basic rules pertaining to 
statutory construction: that in case of conflict, a later 
enactment is controlling over an earlier one; and that express 
provisions of statutes take preference over general ones. 
Id. at 551. 
Now, Defendants make the same arguments rejected in Pacific 
Intermountain Express. They claim § 59-1-301, enacted in 1898 (Df 
bf p. 22) , and found among the "Miscellaneous Provisions" of the 
Tax Code, should control over the specific refund provisions of the 
Income Tax Act, enacted in 1973. § 59-10-529. But, Utah continues 
to follow the rule that new statutes, when relating to the same 
subject matter as existing statues, are "deemed controlling as it 
29
 Section 59-11-11 has been renumbered as § 59-1-301, but 
the protest statute remains virtually unchanged. 
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is a later expression of the Legislature," Ellis v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 882, 884, 885 (Utah App. 1988)30. 
Defendants raise what they claim to be a contrary rule in 
State v. District Court, 102 Utah 290, 115 P.2d 913 (1941) and Shea 
v. Tax Commission, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (1941). Both cases 
involved refunds for diesel fuel taxes invalidated in Carter v. 
State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727 (1939). 
In the State case, the taxpayer had actually paid the fuel 
taxes under protest and the court was determining the appropriate 
statute of limitations. Even though the protest statute clearly 
required a six (6) month limitation, the court was badly divided. 
A two Justice plurality reluctantly applied the six month statute 
only because: 1) no other statutory remedy was provided for fuel 
tax refunds, and 2) the shorter statute helped resolve a "cloud on 
the right of the state to use taxes" paid under protest because the 
30
 If the Utah Legislature had intended the protest statute 
to be the sole remedy for unlawfully collected income taxes, or if 
it had any dispute with the application of specific tax remedies 
over the general protest remedy, it missed a perfect opportunity 
when it completely revised Title 59 in 1987. Among the many 
changes made (see Appendix A to Title 59 showing 1987 revisions), 
the legislature added a remedy (59-13-202) to the Motor Fuel Tax 
Act, moved the protest remedy (59-11-11) to the property tax act 
(59-2-101 et seq; protest renumbered as 59-2-141), and made 
stylistic changes in the wording of the income tax refund remedy. 
Laws of Utah 1987, Chapters 2 through 6. The legislature missed 
another opportunity in 1988 when it removed the protest remedy from 
the Property Tax Act and placed it back in the miscellaneous tax 
provisions (renumbered as 59-1-301), in apparent recognition that 
the Property Tax Act already included a specific remedy (59-2-1313) 
while chapters imposing other taxes had no remedy. Laws of Utah 
1988 Ch. 3 § 88. 
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office collecting them was required to segregate all funds paid 
under protest until the dispute was resolved. The concurring 
opinion agreed only because the statutory requirement for 
segregating funds favored a short statute. Two Justices dissented. 
Id. at 915 and 916. 
State is distinguishable because income taxes are not fuel 
taxes and no segregation of income taxes is required. § 59-10-101, 
et seq.31 
In Shea, the plaintiffs had not paid the fuel taxes under 
protest, and the Court attempted to find another remedy in the 
wording of the fuel tax statute authorizing the rcrturn of any fuel 
taxes "collected through error." The Court found the word "error" 
was too narrow to encompass unlawful collections. The Court held 
the protest statute to be the exclusive remedy for refunds of 
unlawful fuel taxes because no alternative remedy existed. 
These cases do not conflict with the later (1957) rule of 
Pacific Intermountain Express, supra. State and Shea dealt with 
diesel fuel taxes collected under a statute allowing no other clear 
remedy. The Court in Pacific Intermountain Express, supra, 
addressed the issue of two apparent and conflicting remedies. When 
two remedies are apparent, the more specific later enactment 
applies. Id. 
31
 Utah has not segregated Plaintiffs1 income tax payments. 
Depo. of Roger Tew. R. 1163, p. 37. 
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Though the protest remedy continues to apply to taxes with no 
administrative remedies for refunds,32 it cannot apply to defeat 
claims under the clear income tax refund provisions of § 59-10-529. 
P. UTAH HAS NEVER REQUIRED PAYMENT UNDER PROTEST FOR INCOME 
TAX REFUNDS; TO DO SO NOW WOULD BE UNFAIR. 
Defendants cannot show one example of a protest requirement 
being raised as a bar in Utah to an income tax refund. The issue 
is not raised by the Commission, which has not applied protest 
requirements to income tax challenges: 
Q. In the income tax context, have you ever barred a refund 
to a taxpayer because the taxpayer failed to pay under protest? 
A. Not to my knowledge. I donft — when I say that, I don't 
remember it coming up, the question of whether paid under 
protest or not. The cases that I have been involved in has 
been a matter of looking as to whether or not^ they owed it. 
The question of whether it was paid under protest has not been 
an issue. 
Depo. of Richard Hanson, Tax Commission Chairman, R. 1159, pp. 22-
23. 
Like the federal system, Utah offers a three year period in 
which either the state or the taxpayer can change the calculations 
on the original income tax return for any justifiable reason. 
U.C.A. §§ 59-10-529, 536. 
As this Court has said: 
32
 Those taxes imposed in Title 59 which offer no specific 
refund remedy include the: equivalent property tax (59-3-101 et. 
seq.), privilege tax (59-4-101 et. seq.), gross receipts tax (59-8-
101 et. seq.), admitted insurers tax (59-9-101 et. seq.), cigarette 
and tobacco tax (59-14-101 et. seq.), educational funding tax (59-
14c-101 et. seq.) and wine and liquor tax (59-16-1 et. seq.). 
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It certainly would be a delusion to require a taxpayer to pay 
the tax, seek a review, and if he prevails, not allow him to 
get it back. (emphasis added) 
Pacific Intermountain at 552. 
6. THE EXISTENCE OF NO PROTEST REMEDY IN 1987 BELIES 
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT IT WAS AND IS PLAINTIFFS' SOLE REMEDY. 
As Defendants concede, the legislature in 1987 removed the 
payment under protest statute, U.C.A. § 59-11-11 (1977) from the 
miscellaneous section of the tax code and placed it in the Property 
Tax Act. Df bf p.22, ftnt 1. In 1988, the legislature again 
placed a payment under protest remedy among the miscellaneous tax 
provisions but also left the protest remedy intact in the Property 
Tax Code. Thus, no payment under protest remedy existed for the 
1987 tax year except in connection with the payment of property 
taxes. Plaintiffs1 only remedy for 1987 is a claim for refund 
under U.C.A. § 57-10-529. This action of the legislature is 
unexplainable if it viewed the protest remedy to be Plaintiffs' 
sole remedy. 
H. PAYMENT UNDER PROTEST IS AN ALTERNATE REMEDY FOR THE 1988 
TAX YEAR. PLAINTIFFS PAID TAXES UNDER PROTEST IN 1988. 
As a precaution, Plaintiffs both protested the 1988 collection 
of taxes and claimed a refund under the normal income tax refund 
procedures in § 59-10-529. Defendants have never objected to 
Plaintiffs1 protest claim and the trial court allowed a refund 
under either or both sections. 
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No particular form of tax protest is required in Utah. 
Murdock v. Murdock, 113 P. 330 (Utah 1911) sets forth the standard 
to which a tax protest must conform: 
No particular form of protest is required by the statute. Nor 
is it required that a protest be in writing. From the facts 
as admitted by the treasurer, she clearly understood that the 
portion of the taxes which were claimed by Heber City were 
paid under protest because they were claimed to be illegal for 
the reason that the sheep upon which they were levied at no 
time were within the territorial limits of said city. What 
more could be required? When the statute prescribes no 
special conditions in making a protest, it would seem that the 
courts can require none. 
Id. at p. 332. 
The purpose of requiring payment under protest is to alert 
public officials of a challenge to the amount of revenue they may 
receive and thus have available to budget, which may make sense in 
a property tax context, but serves no purpose in an income tax 
setting.33 But "where there was an existing controversy, known 
to the public officials,.. .there is no question but that the tax 
collecting authorities had knowledge of which tax the 'paid under 
protest1 referred to." Peterson v. Bountiful City, 477 P.2d 153, 
156 (Utah 1970). The extensive attention given to the Davis ruling 
by the press in March and April of 1989 and the Commission's public 
response clearly indicate Defendants' awareness of the protest. 
The Commission has consistently viewed filing an amended 
return asking for a refund as tantamount to filing under protest. 
The State of Utah does not attempt to segregate income 
taxes paid under protest. R. 1163# p. 37. 
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This is precisely the position taken by the Commission at trial. 
Referring to the April 5, 1989 press release, defendants stated in 
a memorandum filed with the trial court: 
There has been no foreclosure of opportunity for refund. In 
fact, the press release states that if any taxpayer disagrees 
with the Commission's assessment, they may file their taxes 
under protest to preserve any rights they may have, (emphasis 
added). 
R. 175. The fact the press release said nothing about "paying 
under protest" indicates the Commission recognized the filing of an 
amended return as constituting payment under protest. 
The Commission, having openly instructed Plaintiffs to file 
amended tax returns to protect their legal rights and recognizing 
the amended returns as a filing of taxes under protest, has 
acknowledged Plaintiffs1 protest and should now be estopped from 
denying that tax payments were made under protest for the 1988 tax 
year by Plaintiffs. 
I. NEITHER LACHES OR WAIVER BAR PLAINTIFFSv CLAIMS. 
Defendants assert the trial court erred in not barring 
Plaintiffs1 claims by laches and waiver. Df bf pp. 44-47. 
Defendants' assertions are without merit for the following reasons. 
1. Defendants cannot show any injury they have suffered. 
Papanikolas Brothers Enter, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc, 
535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). Defendants have collected an 
illegal tax for 40 years and have thus been enriched at the expense 
of Plaintiffs. No matter when in the last 40 years Plaintiffs 
brought this action, they could claim a refund back three years. 
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It would not have mattered if Plaintiffs had brought this action 
twenty years ago. Defendants have only benefitted by the extra 
length of time they have collected illegal taxes. 
2. Laches is an equitable defense which "refuses to lend its 
aid to a party whose conduct is inequitable." Rohr v. Rohr, 709 
P.2d 382 (Utah 1985). Since Defendants unlawfully collected taxes, 
equity will not respond to their cry for help. 
3. Defendants cannot show lack of diligence on the part of 
members of the Plaintiff class, Papanikolas Brothers, supra, unless 
they can show how retirees, some whom did not even retire until 
after 1985, could have brought a claim 20 or 30 years ago before 
their claim was ripe. 
4. Defendants argue that because the language of § 111 was 
clear, Plaintiffs were not diligent in challenging this statute 
sooner. Defendants apparently argue there exists a higher standard 
for taxpayers to study and analyze a clear tax law than exists for 
the Commission itself. 
5. Laches or waiver should not defeat a specific clear 
refund statute with a specific statute of limitation cutting off 
the rights of taxpayers to obtain a refund. In the statute, the 
legislature has expressed the period during which inaction is 
acceptable. Inaction standing alone should never defeat a cause of 
action within the statutory period of limitations. 
6. To say that any one taxpayer by acting within the statute 
of limitations caused the total burden to the state is a fallacy. 
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Any delay by one taxpayer cannot result in more than one refund. 
Laches could only be addressed on an individual claim basis. 
Defendants1 defenses of laches and waiver must fail. 
VIII. DEFENDANTS IMPROPERLY ASK THE COURT TO CRAFT A NEW REMEDY IN 
PLACE OF TAX REFUND STATUTES (BUT EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW) . 
Defendants inexplicably ask this Court to apply the state 
doctrine of retroactivity to relieve Utah from its statutory duty 
to pay refunds even if Davis is retroactive under federal law. Df 
bf pp. 84-89. That equity allows a court to deny stare decisis 
effect to its own law-reversing decisions is not disputed; but 
here, Defendants urge the Court, in the guise of equity to deny 
effect to a retroactive decision of the U.S. Supreme Court and to 
emasculate Utah's tax refund statute because State Government would 
rather spend Plaintiffs1 wages elsewhere. 
Even if Utah had the power of selective secession from the 
laws of the Union34; it could not re-define equity to nullify the 
laws and Constitution of Utah, or the Constitution of the United 
States. 
A. THE TAX REFUND STATUTE IS THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF 
UTAH. 
Defendants complain that federal minimum due process does not 
mandate refunds, and that "Utah needs to do nothing more." Df bf 
34
 Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal Union and the 
Constitution of the United States is the "Supreme Law of the Land." 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 3. "The laws of the United States 
are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the 
citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are." Claflin v. 
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876). 
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p. 85. Defendants miss the point. Utah HAS done more, it HAS 
enacted tax refund statutes. [cf. McKesson v. Florida, 110 S.Ct. 
2238, 2258, ftnt 36). "The State is free, of course, to provide 
broader relief as a matter of State law than is required by the 
Federal Constitution." ]. 
All political power is inherent in the people . . . " Utah 
Constitution, Art. I, § 2, and the people have chosen through 
elected representatives to refund income taxes improperly 
collected. U.C.A. § 59-10-529. This is the voice of the people of 
Utah and is their codification of equity. 
B. THE CONSTITUTION OP UTAH PROTECTS A CLEAR STATUTORY 
REMEDY FROM EROSION BY POLITICAL EXPEDIENCE. 
Defendants call the income tax refund statute "draconian" and 
claim the district court "abused its discretion in ordering 
refunds". Df bf pp. 84-86. 
Defendants would not claim abuse of discretion if this case 
had involved only one or even a thousand claims. The refund remedy 
is too plain and obvious to bar individual claims. What Defendants 
mean when they call refunds "draconian" is that, this time, there 
are too many taxpayers with too many claims. The case is 
politically uncomfortable and inexpedient, and Defendants hope the 
court will carve an exception into the refund statute for big cases 
involving too many claims. 
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But, the tax refund statute applies the same whether a refund 
is claimed by one taxpayer or by thirty-four thousand, and the Utah 
Constitution will buttress the statutory remedy. 
Utah's constitutionally mandated separation of powers, Utah 
Constitution, Art. V, § 1 (more specific in the U.S. Constitution) 
prohibits a court from acting in equity to carve exceptions in a 
plain statute to meet hardship in a particular case; to do so would 
be "a usurpation of legislative power". Smith v. Schwartz, 21 Utah 
126, 60 P. 305 (1899). See also State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 
P. 632 (1913); State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). The 
wisdom or policy of a tax statute does not concern the courts of 
Utah. Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 P. 1097 (1897); see also 
Utah Manufacturers Ass'n. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229 
(1933) . There is no authority in government which can invalidate 
a constitutional statute. Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 
368, 57 P.l (1899); State ex rel. Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 72 
P. 388 (1903). 
Utahn's have a guaranteed "remedy by due course of law", Utah 
Constitution, Art. I, § 11. To the extent Defendants deny one 
federal retiree a tax refund because there are too many others also 
claiming refunds or because he is a member of a less deserving 
group, they offend Utah's guarantees of equal protection and 
uniform operation of laws. Utah Constitution, Art. I, §§ 2 and 24. 
C. FEDERAL DUE PROCESS DEMANDS A REMEDY. 
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Once a constitutional decision applies and renders a state tax 
invalid, due process, not equitable considerations, will 
generally dictate the scope of relief offered. 
ATA at 2339. 
Defendants claim to have complied with federal due process by 
providing pre-deprivation hearings, and therefore "need do nothing 
more". Df bf p.85. But, Utah's pre-deprivation proceedings 
require the payment of a tax before court review and are therefore 
deficient.35 McKesson Corp. v. Florida, 110 S.Ct. at 2251. 
When a State penalizes taxpayers for failure to remit their 
taxes in timely fashion, thus requiring them to pay first 
before obtaining review of the tax's validity, federal due 
process principles long recognized by our cases require the 
State's post-deprivation procedure to provide a "clear and 
certain remedy," O'Connor, 223 U.S. at 285, for the 
deprivation of tax monies in an unconstitutional manner. 
Id. at 2258. 
Our decision today in McKesson makes clear that once a state's 
tax statute is held invalid under the Commerce Clause, the 
state is obligated to provide relief consistent with federal 
due process principles. 
ATA at 2332. 
Where a state can easily foresee the invalidation of its tax 
statutes, its reliance interests may merit little concern. 
Id. at 2333. 
The State's interest in financial stability does not justify 
a refusal to provide relief. 
McKesson at 2257. 
35
 Utah's pre-deprivation process requires a taxpayer to 
raise claims of unlawful taxation before a Commission with no power 
to declare the validity of laws; the taxpayer must pay the tax 
before gaining access to a court empowered to grant a remedy. 
U.C.A. S§ 59-1-501 through 505. 
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We reject respondents' intimation that the cost of any refund 
considered by the State might justify a decision to withhold 
it. Just as a State may not object to an otherwise available 
remedy providing for the return of real property unlawfully 
taken or criminal fines unlawfully imposed simply because it 
finds the property or monies useful, so also Florida cannot 
object to a refund here just because it has other ideas about 
how to spend the funds. 
Id. at 2557 (ftnt 35) 
D. EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW. 
Defendants see the equities in their favor because "Utah 
simply had no reason to doubt the validity of the exemption". Df 
bf p. 62. But, reading § 111 would have given them reason to 
doubt, especially in view of Utahfs settled position that 
retirement benefits are deferred compensation. As the trial court 
observed, "No person and no government can be excused by ignorance 
of the law, even widespread ignorance." Conclusions of Law, p. 19, 
R. 1137. 
Defendants further urge the court to "balance the relative 
benefit to any individual plaintiff . . . against the relative harm 
to the state". Df bf p. 63. One State Supreme Court Justice has 
considered the equity posed by federal retiree tax refund claims: 
I am unable to see the "inequity" involved in requiring the 
State to return any money it has unconstitutionally taken from 
the plaintiffs. In my view, the fact that the State is 
experiencing financial difficulties has little to do with 
whether it would be inequitable to require the State to refund 
the plaintiffs1 money. Nothing in the record before us 
indicates that the plaintiffs, federal pensioners and military 
personnel, are experiencing any less financial difficulties 
than the State of North Carolina. Further, unlike the State, 
the plaintiffs do not have the power of taxation at their 
disposal when attempting to deal with their financial 
difficulties. There simply is nothing "inequitable" or wrong 
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about ordering that the State not pick a taxpayer fs pocket or 
in requiring it to return the money when it is caught doing 
so. I believe it is entirely equitable and just to apply the 
rule announced in Davis retroactively so as to require that 
the State return any taxes it has unconstitutionally collected 
from the plaintiffs. 
Swanson v. State, 407 S.E. 2d 791, 797 (N.C. 1991) (Dissent by J. 
Mitchell, joined by C.J. Exum and J. Frye) (the majority noted only 
that the state was in "dire financial straits" and that refunds 
would therefore be inequitable. Id. at 794.) 
Defendants also unfairly ask a single taxpayer's need for 
return of his money to be weighed against the statefs obligation to 
all class members. The proper balancing must weigh a refund to a 
taxpayer against the cost to the state of that single refund. This 
is NOT one large case; this is thirty-four thousand small cases. 
Taken to its conclusion, Defendants' argument is that if the 
state unlawfully taxes a sufficiently large number of taxpayers, it 
should be excused. 
Defendants argue, using figures stricken by the trial court as 
irrelevant, that the cost of nearly $104 million (a figure 
Plaintiffs believe to be much, much too high) would create a 
financial hardship to the State. (This also assumes that all class 
members will claim their refund, a fact disproved in those states 
in which federal retiree refunds have been given). Defendants' 
numbers are impressive in a vacuum, but would amount to only 2.7% 
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of the Statefs $3.8 billion 1992 budget.36 This percentage is 
smaller than the margin of accuracy in the state budget 
projections. Defendants1 conclusions about the cutback of services 
and "staggering" tax increases are also pure speculation. 
(Plaintiffs also contest Defendants1 assertion that the State has 
current fiscal problems. Id. Fiscal problems are relative, of 
course, and invite a comparison to the fiscal problems of retirees 
on fixed incomes). 
As Defendants suggest, a comparison of the relative benefit to 
each taxpayer with the burden to the state is (though unfair) 
illuminating. Defendants1 figures (for 1988) yield an average 
refund of about $478.00 per year per taxpayer.37 For a taxpayer 
on a fixed retirement of $20,000.00 per year, the unlawful taxes he 
or she paid and wants back for four years amounts to more than 2.7% 
of his or her annual income. The 2.7% impact on the State is small 
relative to the impact on the taxpayer. In relative terms, the 
total cost of refunds to the State of 2.7% of its annual budget is 
equivalent to $540.00 in a $20,000.00 income. Unpleasant, yes, but 
not financially devastating. 
36
 Plaintiffs request judicial notice of Utahfs 1992 budget 
of $3.8 billion, with a $34 million surplus from 1991 and a $56.7 
million "rainy-day fund". See, e.g., Deseret News Article, "Utahfs 
Finances in Good Shape as National Economy Struggles", January 6-7, 
1992, p. D5. 
37
 See: footnote 40. 
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What can be fairly said is that the State has other places it 
would rather spend the money it has unlawfully collected. But, a 
taxpayer on a fixed income also has other needs he or she would 
prefer to spend money on than to pay unlawful taxes. The fulcrum 
for the decision is not what the state would rather do, but what it 
must do. 
Defendants see inequity in asking other taxpayers in Utah to 
absorb the cost of retiree refunds. Plaintiffs see in this result 
the fairness that should have existed at the time of taxation. 
Asking Utah to spread its tax burden to those who should have paid 
the cost in the first place is not inequitable, it is just. And, 
it should not be forgotten that other taxpayers in Utah have reaped 
the benefit of unlawful taxes on federal retirees since enactment 
of the law in 1947. 
Utah's argument of the inequity of requiring it to honor its 
tax refund obligations is reminiscent of the many divorced fathers 
who appear in court every week arguing that they should not have to 
pay child support because they have re-married and their new family 
needs the money more. 
Nothing has been said about the cost to the State of failing 
to restore what it has unlawfully taken. Equity considers more 
than money, and the cost to the state in avoiding its obligation is 
much greater than money. Equity should concern itself with the 
loss of confidence and respect for law by those who must pay the 
State's bills, the taxpayers. Should not they be left with 
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confidence that, if the State has improperly taxed their income, 
the State will give it back? 
No honorable government would keep taxes to which it is not 
entitled, and the legislative scheme supports that result. 
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal v. Dept. of Revenue, 776 P.2d 1061 (Ariz. 
1989) . 
In the best and final sense, equity is what the people of Utah 
have provided: income tax refunds. Where rights are settled, 
"equity follows the law." Protrka v. Palmer, 423 P.2d 514, 246 Or. 
467 (1967); Jarvis v. State Land Dept., 479 P.2d 169, 106 Ariz. 506 
(1970); Independent School Dist. No. 89 v. Oklahoma City Federation 
of Teachers, 612 P.2d 719 (Okla. 1980). 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
AND PROPERLY WAIVED EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
A. THE COURT'S JURISDICTION IS BEST DETERMINED BY THE RELIEF 
SOUGHT. 
Plaintiffs filed refund claims with the Commission. When 
these were denied and the Commission's public position was clear, 
Plaintiffs filed a class action for declaratory relief. With this 
case pending, the Commission continued administrative action on 
refund claims. Plaintiffs sought relief from further 
administrative remedies under U.C.A. § 63-46b-14 and the court so 
ordered. R. 251. Ignoring this order, the Commission attempted to 
compel five class members to participate in formal hearings 
addressing the retroactivity of the Davis decision. These five 
objected and petitioned for an injunction enforcing the court order 
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that members of the class need not exhaust administrative remedies. 
R. 292. The Commission objects that the court meddled in its 
affairs. 
The Court prefaced its consideration of jurisdiction by 
describing the relief sought: 
Plaintiffs claim tax refunds for the tax years 1985, 1986, 
1987 and 1988 on the basis of overpayment under U.C.A. § 59-
10-529(7). Plaintiffs pray for 1) a declaratory order that 
Utah's taxation of federal retirees was unlawful for all tax 
years in dispute, and 2) an order compelling Defendants to 
recognize Plaintiffs' class claims for refund, and to compute 
and pay refunds. 
Conclusions of Law, p. 7, R. 1125. Defendants do not dispute this. 
Defendants do not challenge the Court's jurisdiction to review 
Plaintiffs' claims that the 1988 taxes were paid under protest and 
should be refunded under U.C.A. § 59-1-301; neither do they 
challenge the Court's authority to certify a class action. 
Defendants challenge the trial Court's jurisdiction on only 
two grounds: 1) jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief, and 2) 
jurisdiction to issue an order compelling action by the Commission 
(mandamus). Df bf p. 36. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A 
DECLARATORY ORDER. 
The District Court has jurisdiction to determine the validity 
of the tax, the availability of refunds, the propriety of the 
class claims for refund and to issue a declaratory order 
resolving those issues pursuant to the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act. 
Conclusions of Law, p. 7, R. 1125. 
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The District Court's jurisdiction is broad. "The district 
court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, 
not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law." 
U.C.A. § 78-3-4 (as amended 1988). The District Court's authority 
to issue declaratory orders is protected under the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-33-1 et seq. U.C.A. § 78-33-1 provides: 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions 
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed. No action or proceedings shall be open to objection 
on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed 
for.38 
Section 78-33-2 provides: 
Any person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations 
are effected by a statute . . . may have determined any 
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . 
statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations thereunder. 
On this issue, Defendants take a position contrary to that 
taken by the Utah Tax Commission in Washington County v. State Tax 
Commission, 103 Ut. 73, 133 P.2d 564 (1943). In that case, the 
taxpayers claimed a statute giving a tax exemption to irrigation 
properties to be unconstitutional. The taxpayer filed an original 
38
 Defendants cite this statute for the proposition that a 
district court has such power only "within its respective 
jurisdiction." Df bf p. 36. They do not see the statute as the 
grant of jurisdiction it is. Evidently, this circuitous reasoning 
arises from a typographical error in Defendant's quotation of the 
statute. The qualifying term "within their respective 
jurisdictions" has obvious reference to the geographical 
jurisdictions (venues) of the individual districts, since all have 
the same subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants have misread 
"jurisdictions" to be in the singular. 
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proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition in the Utah Supreme Court, 
alleging the Commission to be without authority to apply a statute 
which is unconstitutional. Id. at 565. The Supreme Court agreed 
that "the Commission has the authority to apply (the statute) only 
if that section is constitutional." Id. at 565. The Court then 
reviewed other remedies available to the taxpayer to determine the 
legality of the tax. The Commission argued "that the petitioners 
have an adequate remedy under the declaratory judgment statutes or 
by injunction" to contest validity of the tax in district court. 
Id. at 566. 
The Court agreed that the first two provisions of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act (now U.C.A. § 68-33-1 and 2): 
do expressly authorize district courts to determine the 
validity of statutes which affect the rights, status, or other 
legal relations of the person bringing the action. 
The court saw, however, unfairness in requiring the taxpayers 
to seek a declaratory order in District Court because: 
the Commission could proceed pursuant to [the challenged 
statute] while the declaratory action was pending. Thus, the 
petitioner might be injured, even though they prevailed in the 
declaratory judgment proceeding. 
Id. at 566. 
Because of this unfairness and possible prejudice to the 
taxpayers in being forced to litigate their claims in both the 
district court and the Commission, the Supreme Court decided the 
issue. Id. at 566. The Court's jurisdiction to grant declaratory 
relief is to be liberally construed with the purpose of settling 
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and affording "relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect 
to rights. . ." U.C.A. § 78-33-12. 
A declaratory action in district court is a long established 
method in Utah for contesting unlawful taxes. See: Crystal Car 
Line v. State Tax Comm'n, 174 P.2d 984 (1946) (all claimants should 
be joined if possible). 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO COMPEL ACTION BY 
THE COMMISSION (MANDAMUS) . 
In addition to an order declaring Utah's tax scheme to be 
unlawful, Plaintiffs sought an order compelling the Commission "to 
recognize Plaintiff's class claims for refund, and to compute and 
pay refunds." Conclusions of Law, p. 7, R. 1125. 
The trial court described the basis for its jurisdiction: 
Jurisdiction in the District Court to compel action by an 
administrative agency through writ of mandamus is protected by 
Art. VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution which provides the 
"district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, 
and power to issue all extraordinary writs." This is 
recognized in U.C.A. § 78-3-4 which gives district court 
judges "power to issue all extraordinary writs necessary to 
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
Conclusions of Law, p. 8, R. 1126. 
The court also has jurisdiction to supplement its declaratory 
order with "further relief . . . whenever necessary or proper". 
U.C.A. § 78-33-8. This chapter, U.C.A. § 78-33-1 et seq. is to be 
"liberally construed and administered." U.C.A. § 78-33-12. 
Defendants correctly recognize that an extraordinary writ 
(mandamus) is appropriate only where no other "plain, speedy or 
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adequate remedy exists". Df bf p. 36. The administrative process 
before the Commission was arguably plain and possibly speedy. But, 
no adequate remedy existed for Plaintiffs before the Commission, 
for the reasons discussed in the following sections. Therefore, 
the trial court properly enforced its declaratory order with an 
order in the form of mandamus. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIEVED PLAINTIFFS OF THE 
REQUIREMENT TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
From the beginning of this dispute, the only administrative 
remedy offered Plaintiffs was a formal hearing before the 
Commission with direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. R. 303-
310, 919. At the time the trial court granted waiver of 
administrative remedies, thousands of retirees were attempting to 
protect their rights at various stages of the pre-hearing process, 
but the express intent of the Commission was to rule on the issues 
at a formal hearing. 
Defendants insistence on a formal adjudicative proceeding 
before the Commission led Plaintiffs to seek relief from exhaustion 
of further remedies. The trial court, applying U.C.A. § 63-46b-14 
(1987), relieved Plaintiffs of further administrative proceedings 
before the Commission. 
1. The trial court had authority in U.C.A. § 63-46b-14 
to relieve Plaintiffs of further administrative remedies. 
Authority for the court to relieve Plaintiffs of the 
requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is found in the Utah 
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Administrative Procedures Act. U.C.A. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(i) and 
(ii) reads: 
The court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the 
requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii) exhaustion 
of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate 
to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
After examining the facts, the trial court ruled that further 
exhaustion would "result in irreparable harm disproportionate to 
the public benefit." R. 250-252. The court also could have 
concluded on the same facts that the administrative remedies were 
inadequate. 
2. Further proceedings before the Commission would have 
caused the taxpayers irreparable harm. 
Initially, thousands of Plaintiffs began in the administrative 
process moving toward a formal hearing before the Commission which 
was publicly committed to the view that the Davis decision did not 
require refunds and the matter would be decided by the courts. R. 
130. 
In considering the burdens imposed by this process, the trial 
court noted Defendants1 concession that the Commission had no 
administrative procedures to protect members of the class. R. 251. 
The Court also noted the older age of Plaintiffs, the size of the 
class, the small amount of average refunds and the cost to 
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Plaintiffs of further proceedings pursuant of claims before the 
Commission.39 
The court found particularly important "the older age of many 
of the Plaintiffs." R. 250. At one of the hearings in the trial 
court, the judge said the following to counsel for the parties: 
One of the things that distresses me in this case, and I will 
tell you both this, is that we1 re dealing with retired 
persons, we are dealing with persons who are subject to age 
infirmities and maturity, . . . 
R. 1157, p. 11 
Also apparent was the unfairness in requiring Plaintiffs to 
litigate their claims in two forums. As the court observed in 
Washington County v. State Tax Commission, (supra), a declaratory 
39
 Defendants challenge these findings for lack of evidence. 
Df bf p. 91. But the number of retirees affected, 34,000, was 
publicly announced by the Commission itself (R. 130), and 
Defendants used this number in making projections. R. 723. This 
figure went unchallenged by Defendants when it was set forth in the 
Statement of Material Facts set forth in Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
R. 397. Judge Young referred twice to the 34,000 figure when 
questioning one of Defendants1 attorneys during a hearing. R. 
1157, pp. 9 and 11. Defendants have never questioned this figure 
until now, for the first time on appeal. Defendants also ignore an 
unchallenged affidavit from Chairman of the Utah Coalition of 
Federal Retirees fixing the class size at about 34,000. R. 241. 
As to age, Defendants cite to the Federal Civil Service Act which 
provides for "regular retirement at age 62 or 60, depending on 
years of service." Df bf p. 28. Until now, no one has challenged 
the court's finding, based on notice of law, observation, and 
arguments of council that the majority of retirees are of advanced 
age. As to the small size of individual claims in relation to the 
cost of pursuing the claim, arguments of this before the trial 
court were never contested. R. 215, 237. Defendants provided 
information from which computation of the average return was made. 
Projections for 1988 refunds, for example, totalled $16,253,000. 
R. 725. With 34,000 potential claimants, the average refund would 
only be $478.00 per claimant. 
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action properly filed in district would not, of itself, terminate 
the administrative procedures. 
While such proceeding might be adequate to test the validity 
of the statutes in question, the Commission could proceed 
pursuant to [the challenged statute] while declaratory action 
was pending. Thus, the petitioners might be injured even 
though they prevailed in the declaratory judgment proceeding. 
Washington County at 566. 
The extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Prohibition in the 
Supreme Court, recognized by this Court in Washington County is now 
supplemented by U.C.A. § 63-46b-14, which serves the same purpose. 
Ultimately, determination of the issues in a formal Commission 
hearing with a record appeal would also have deprived Plaintiffs of 
their due process right to a plenary hearing before a fair and 
impartial tribunal and of their right to a remedy by due course of 
law. 
3. Further proceedings before the Commission were not 
justified by the incidental public benefit to be gained. 
Defendants presented no evidence of any public benefit by 
proceeding before the Commission. The Commission was not an 
impartial quasi-judicial body after it publicly announced refunds 
would not be granted unless ordered by the courts. R. 79, 130, 
595, 598. To all the world, the Commission no longer appeared 
impartial. 
Any remaining public benefit was an illusion only. The 
Commission had no authority to invalidate Utahfs tax laws, Shea v. 
-74-
State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274, 275 (1941), so it 
was not empowered to grant the refund remedy taxpayers sought. 
E. COMMISSION HEARINGS COULD NOT HAVE AFFORDED PLAINTIFFS 
"DUE PROCESS" OR "REMEDY BY DUE COURSE OF LAW." 
For almost three years, Defendants have urged (tried to 
compel) Plaintiffs to pursue their claims for refund before the 
Commission.40 Defendants claim sole jurisdiction in the Commission 
to determine the retroactivity of the Davis decision, decide the 
validity of Utah's tax laws, and to consider the availability of 
refunds. Df bf p. 35. If the Commission does not have sole 
jurisdiction, Defendants claim it to have primary concurrent 
jurisdiction to proceed first. Df bf pp. 30-37. 
However, the threshold issue in this case is the validity of 
Utah's tax scheme for retirees. As set forth below, consideration 
of that issue in a formal hearing before the Commission with record 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court would deny Plaintiffs their rights 
to due process and remedy by due course of law. Intervention of 
the district court was necessary. 
1. Tax Commission hearings could not provide due 
process. 
Due process is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and by the Utah Constitution Art. 
40
 The Commission's eagerness to claim full jurisdiction has 
puzzled Plaintiffs in view of Defendants' contention that 
Plaintiffs' sole remedy was to pay their taxes under protest and 
pursue refunds in the district court (U.CA. § 59-1-304). Df bf 
pp. 20-27. 
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1, § 7. The protections are substantially similar. C/nterjneyer v. 
State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942). These 
protection do not mandate a court hearing if the administrative 
process provides a fair opportunity to be hecird. Id. As a 
minimum, due process requires a fair hearing before an impartial 
tribunal. Nebraska Press Assoc, v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, (1976). 
The Commission was not impartial, having answered the 
inquiries of hundreds of retirees, R. 1163, p. 23, with a press 
release defining Utahfs response to the Davis decision. 
We view the Supreme Court ruling as applying to tax years 
beginning in 1989. The Commission takes the same position as 
other states with similar laws, that refunds of past taxes 
paid by federal employees are not mandated by the (Davis) 
decision. (emphasis added). 
State Tax Commission Press Release, Issued by Chairman Roger Tew, 
April 5, 1989, R. 79, 130, 595. (Addendum Exh. 1). The trial 
court relied heavily on the Commissions want of impartiality in 
denying Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss on the issue of jurisdiction 
and exhaustion of remedies. R. 250.41 
41
 The 1989 Utah tax return information booklet, for 
example, sent to all Utah taxpayers included a "Note to Federal 
Retirees: . . . the issue of . . . refunds of state taxes paid in 
preceding years will be decided by the Court." Specific "statutory 
notices" sent to federal retirees filing amended tax returns 
contains the same information. R. 919, 923. Defendants attempt to 
distance themselves from the statutory notices by saying they were 
from the audit division of the Commission and do not reflect a 
decision by the Commission. Df bf pp. 32 and 33. But, the action 
by the audit division was dictated by the Commissioners. 
Deposition of Clyde Nichols, Executive Director, R. 1160, p. 5. In 
arguments on the issue of administrative remedies, Defendants again 
affirmed that "the Tax Commission's view is that the Davis case 
applies . . . only to taxes after that date (prospective only) . R. 
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Plaintiffs also faced the disconcerting problem of being 
forced to plead their case before commissioners who were named 
personal defendants in Plaintiffs1 pending § 1983 civil rights 
action, and in opposing attorneys ostensibly arguing for the State 
before the Commission but representing the Commission in court on 
the same issues.42 This is not due process. 
2. Tax Commission hearings could not provide a remedy 
by due course of law. 
Article I# § 11 of the Utah Constitution mandates that, in 
Utah: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party. 
This guarantee has no analogue in the federal constitution and 
is not synonymous with due process. Berry v. Beech, 111 P.2d 670, 
674 (1985). The focus of this protection is on a fair remedy, and 
mandates that individuals not be "arbitrarily deprived of effective 
remedies designed to protect basic individual rights". Id. at 675. 
1158, p. 10. 
42
 The Attorney General's office advised the Commissioners 
and assisted them in formulating a policy in dealing with Davis. 
R. 1159, p. 31. The Attorney General's office is representing the 
Commission in this lawsuit and following their clients' wishes in 
denying refunds. If this matter was sent to the Commission for a 
hearing, the same office that advises the Commission would be 
arguing the Commission's position in front of the Commission. R. 
1159, p. 32. Such a proceeding does not have the appearance of 
fairness. 
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An administrative proceeding may substitute for a court action, but 
may not be used to divest a citizen of a remedy. See generally 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n Utah, 657 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah 1982); Industrial Comm'n v. Evains, 52 Utah 394, 
409, 174 P.2d 825, 829 (1918). 
The Commission had no authority to address the necessary 
threshold issue of the legality of Utahfs tax on federal retirees. 
The Commission is required by law to administer and enforce the tax 
laws of the state. U.C.A. § § 59-1-210(5), and 59-10-544(1). It 
has no discretionary power to decide what laws to enforce or to 
rule laws invalid. The Commission is not empowered to determine 
questions of legality or constitutionality of legislative 
enactments. Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274, 
275 (1941). 
In Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 
592 (1964) , this court held that an appeal through an 
administrative agency was not a pre-requisite to bringing an action 
in district court since the question before the court was one 
strictly of law. 
We agree that, under most circumstances, exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is required before legal action may be 
taken. However, this only applies where the discretion of an 
administrative officer or body, acting pursuant to statutory 
directive is in question. It does not apply when, as here, 
the administrative officer or body, acts without the scope of 
his or its defined statutory authority. The question here 
involved, being strictly one of law, is for the courts and an 
appeal to the Board of Examiners would have been futile and 
useless. 
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Id. at 595.43 
Because this case is a direct and frontal attack on the 
lawfulness and constitutionality of the state income tax law44 as 
applied to federal retirees, and because the Commission does not 
have power to rule on a constitutional issue, any proceeding before 
the Commission would have been meaningless. "It is a basic tenet 
of the law that one should not be required to do a useless thing.11 
In Re: Tanner, 549 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah 1976). For Plaintiffs to 
seek a remedy before the Commission would be futile since the 
Commission could not offer the relief sought by Plaintiffs. And, 
with no remedy available, Plaintiffs would have been denied access 
to the courts without a "remedy by due course of law". Utah 
Constitution, Article I, § 11. 
F. CONSIDERATION OF THE RETROACTIVITY OF A U.S. SUPREME COURT 
DECISION IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE TAX COMMISSION'S 
AUTHORITY AND EXPERTISE. 
43
 This language is similar to that found in Silver v. State 
Tax Coram1 n, 168 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Sup. Ct. August 30, 1991), 
wherein the Court said: "The interpretation of the language of § 
59-14A-92 is a pure question of law upon which the technical 
expertise of the agency and its experience in administering the tax 
laws will be of no real assistance." 
44
 This is not the "mere introduction of a constitutional 
issue" addressed in Johnson v. Retirement Bd., 621 P.2d 1234, 1237-
8 (Utah 1980), and Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 
U.S. 534, 539-40, 78 S.Ct. at 450, cited at Df bf p. 35. 
Defendants argue that the Commission could avoid the constitutional 
question by finding that the statute of limitations had expired, 
but his ignores the Commission's public position that a three year 
statute applied to federal retiree refund claims are long enough to 
cover Plaintiff's filings. R. 930. Apparently, the Commission 
desires jurisdiction to change its mind. Df bf at pp. 25-27. 
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Defendants overriding defense to refunds is their claim that 
Davis is not retroactive. R. 641-664, Df bf pp. 39-62. They 
insist that the Commission should have heard and decided this 
issue. Df bf p. 35. Though the Commission does not even claim the 
authority to invalidate laws45, Defendants claim it has the unique 
prerogative and ability to declare a U.S. Supreme Court opinion to 
have prospective-only application.46 
Though the Commissioners must have knowledge of tax policy, 
they need no legal training. U.C.A. § 59-1-202. Yet, the 
Commission claims within its authority and expertise a uniquely 
judicial function: to interpret and apply the federal law of 
retroactivity, a uniquely judicial doctrine. 
Even if the Commission had the expertise and legal authority 
to administer federal law, it would yet lack the power to relieve 
a court decision of its retroactive (stare decisis) effect. Such 
judicial functions are not even distant cousins to the Commission's 
statutory charge "to administer and supervise the tax laws of the 
State." U.C.A. § 59-1-210. 
6. THE COMMISSION COULD NOT HAVE PROTECTED THROUGH ITS 
PROCEDURES ALL MEMBERS OF THE CLASS. 
45
 Deposition of Roger Tew, R. 612. Their sole law changing 
authority is to transmit recommended changes to the governor. 
U.C.A. § 59-1-210(22). 
46
 Apparently, they would claim the same authority to deny 
retroactive effect to a Utah Supreme Court opinion which they 
viewed as burdensome to the Utah Treasury. 
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Well educated, informed and financially fixed federal retirees 
probably filed timely individual claims for refund. These 
individuals may have been able to pursue their claims through 
proper procedures and could have appealed, through their lawyers, 
the complex legal issues of the case.47 But, options for these few 
individuals would leave thousands of others with no meaningful 
option at all. 
Class actions allow protection for those plaintiffs who could 
not protect themselves. Many federal retirees are in hospitals or 
nursing homes, or are too poor or too unsophisticated to properly 
file claims. Many, probably most, could not justify the expense of 
hiring an attorney or CPA to properly pursue their individual 
claims. R. 303-310. Many were undoubtedly misled by the public 
pronouncements of the Commission, whom they viewed as impartial and 
authoritative, telling them that Davis did not mandate refunds. 
For those reasons, and more, the representative Plaintiffs pursued 
a class action. 
Defendants now argue that all similarly situated retirees 
could have been protected through a declaratory action before the 
Commission pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-21 (1989) and Utah Admin. R. 
861-1-5A(Q). Df bf p. 32. This is not true. Even if the 
Commission had the authority to consider the complex legal issues, 
47
 However, the cost of such a proceeding would make such an 
undertaking financially unrealistic and undoubtedly is what caused 
members of the Plaintiff class to resist efforts to individually 
proceed before the Commission. R. 303-310. 
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and to invalidate Utah's tax law (it has no such ciuthority) , it has 
never had the ability to make rulings affecting the rights of 
parties not before it. A declaratory order that would 
substantially prejudice the rights of a person who would be a 
necessary party may be issued only if that person consents in 
writing. U.C.A. § 63-46b-21(3)(b). To date, no person has 
consented. 
Obtaining the written consent of all retirees who would be 
bound by the decision would have been outrageously burdensome 
compared to the simpler class action procedure in court. In view 
of this, the Courtfs acknowledgement of Defendants1 concession was 
justified: 
Defendants concede that the Utah State Tax Commission has no 
administrative procedures to consider and process a class 
action that would preserve and protect the rights of and grant 
relief the representative members of the class seek. 
Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, paragraph 2.D. R. 251. 
H. IN DECIDING LEGAL ISSUES, THE COURT DID NOT STOP THE 
COMMISSION FROM DOING WHAT IT DOES BEST. 
Having decided the legal issues and concluding that refunds 
should be paid to class members, the Court returned the matter to 
the Commission to pay refunds. R. 1141. All class members who 
desire refunds will now need to file amended income tax returns 
which the Commission can challenge, audit and review through its 
administrative process. The court has only preserved for all class 
members their right to do so. 
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All considered, this is a very fair division of 
responsibilities between the Court and the Commission. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED ITS ORDER RELIEVING 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WITH A TEMPORARY 
INJUNCTION. 
Ignoring the court1s February 20, 1990, Order waiving further 
exhaustion of administrative remedies by members of the class, the 
state on May 30, 1990, attempted to compel five class members to 
appear at a formal hearing on their refund claims. R. 292. By 
this procedure, the Commission intended to bind all other retirees 
to its decision. R. 223. 
The five class members sought relief from the hearing, 
reaffirming their inclusion in the class and protesting the cost 
and burden of a separate proceeding in light of their small refund 
claims. R. 303-310. 
On June 8, 1990, the trial court enjoined for 45 days48 the 
holding of administrative hearings by the Commission to allow class 
members time to opt out of the class and pursue individual claims 
if they desired. R. 367. The Commission was specifically directed 
to proceed with hearings on those who opted out of the class. R. 
367. Defendants now object, claiming the "Tax Injunction Act bars 
the District Court from enjoining Commission proceedings.11 Df bf 
p. 38. Defendants' reliance on this act is misplaced. U.C.A. § 
59-1-704 only restricts suits filed "for the purpose of restraining 
The 45 days having expired, the issue is now moot. 
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the assessment or collection of any tax, penalty, or interest 
imposed" by the provisions cited. The statute has no application 
to an injunction enforcing a court order waiving exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, for a refund of taxes already collected. 
When the court ruled that Plaintiffs need not exhaust 
administrative remedies the Commission had no business trying to 
compel further remedies. The district courts have authority and 
"power to issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary 
to carry into effect their orders. . ." U.C.A. § 78-3-4 (as 
amended 1988). 
X. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DEFINED THE CLASS. 
Defendants1 first argument on appeal is that the trial court 
erred in defining the class to: 1) include the 1984 tax year, 2) 
include military retirees, and 3) include taxpayers who did not 
personally protest their 1988 taxes. Df bf, pp. 19-21. 
Defendants' objections regarding the inclusion of the 1984 tax 
year confuse the class definition with the relief ultimately 
granted. Though initially included in the class, 1984 taxpayers 
have no valid claim to a refund and were excluded from the final 
class definition. R. 01121. 
Defendants1 objections to inclusion of military retirees in 
the class is unfounded. Claims presented by military retirees 
present the same "questions of law or fact common to the class" 
required under Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Defendants' objection is not really a class definition objection; 
they raise an issue of substantive law. Consideration of this 
issue shows no legal distinction to exist between claims of 
military retirees and civil service retirees49. See: § XI, supra. 
Defendants1 objection to inclusion in the class of those who 
did not personally file protest claims raises two issues: 1) 
whether a protest is necessary, and 2) whether the actions of 
several thousand class members including class representatives 
suffice for all members of the class? 
The first issue is an attempt to eliminate all refunds for the 
years 1985 through 1987 and is Defendants1 principal dispute. See: 
§ VIII, supra. 
To the extent defendants raise the second issue, Defendants 
flay at the purpose of a class action. 
The size of the class and even the propriety of a class action 
were dictated by the declaratory relief sought in the district 
court. 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made 
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected 
by the declaration... 
Even the Commission sees no distinction between military 
and civilian retiree claims. When asked if the Commission 
distinguished the two claims, Commissioner Roger Tew answered: No. 
I think our premise, from the very beginning, was that while the 
Davis decision did not specifically address military, we found no 
reason to except it. Depo. of Commissioner Roger Tew, R. 1163, p. 
40. 
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U.C.A. § 78-33-11. The obvious mechanism for accomplishing the 
legislative mandate in this case was through a class action which 
Defendants do not challenge. 
In addition to the mandate of § 78-33-11 is the provision of 
U.C.A. § 59-10-529(7) allowing claims to be filed by the taxpayers' 
"legal representative". Among the many "legal representative(s)" 
who may act for a taxpayer are court appointed representative 
plaintiffs. Their actions in filing "class claims" for refund, in 
protesting the tax and their later filing of a class "Protective 
Claim" for refund on March 30, 1990, on a form prepared and 
authorized by the Commission on behalf of all "class 
representatives and class members similarly situated" (R.593) 
protects the class. 
The filing of class actions in state district court to obtain 
refunds of illegal taxes were encouraged twice by the Utah Supreme 
Court during the 1980's. [See: Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. 
of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985). "We conclude that any action 
for a refund must be brought either by each food service...or by a 
plaintiff suing on behalf of all the establishments as a class..." 
and Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist.. 724 P.2d 960, 963 n.l (Utah 
1986), citing Utah Rest. Ass'n.] 
Courts have permitted taxpayers to file class action suits 
under statutory refund provisions which are similar to those 
contained in Utah law. In Santa Barbara Optical Co.. Inc. v. State 
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Bd. of Equalization. 120 Cal. Rptr. 609, 47 Cal.App.3d 244 (1975), 
the California Appeals Court states as follows: 
We conclude claimant, as used in Section 910, must be equated 
with the class itself and therefore reject the suggested 
necessity for filing an individual claim for each member of 
the purported class. To require such detailed information in 
advance of the complaint would severely restrict the 
maintenance of appropriate class actions - contrary to 
recognized policy favoring them. We do not believe the claims 
statutes were intended to thwart class relief. 
Moreover, treating the class as a claimant is consistent with 
the treatment of the class for purposes of filing the 
complaint. While Section 422.40 of the code of Civil 
Procedure requires a complaint to name the parties, it is 
settled that the pleading need only establish the existence of 
an ascertainable class rather than name each member of the 
class. (citations omitted). 
Id. at 611-612. 
The purposes of a protest requirement, if any existed, (and if 
the claim requirement contained in § 59-10-529(7) does not apply) 
are to provide the commission with an opportunity to evaluate the 
merits of a claim and to place it on notice as to the potential 
liability. The filing of this suit as a class action, the filing 
of the class claim for refund by counsel for the Plaintiffs and the 
filing of more than 55,000 amended income tax returns and/or claims 
for refund by Plaintiffs satisfied these purposes. 
The trial court's certification of the class also reflects the 
intent of the legislative and commission to protect as many federal 
retirees as possible. The legislature affirmatively extended the 
limitation for refund claims specifically for this case, and the 
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Commission's actions have consistently indicated an attempt to 
cover everyone.50 
XI. MILITARY RETIREES WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE CLASS SINCE 
MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY IS DEFERRED COMPENSATION. 
Defendants argue that military retirement pay is not deferred 
compensation, but represents reduced pay for reduced service. 
Thus, Defendants conclude military retirement pay is current 
compensation and not retirement compensation. Df bf p. 29. 
Defendants apparently contend the Utah tax was discriminatory only 
as to the nature of the compensation and not its source and is 
therefore a valid tax under Davis.51 
In response to McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) , a case 
dealing with the status of military retirement pay. Congress passed 
the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 
50
 See, e.g., Deposition of Commissioner Roger Tew: "We were 
very concerned that the right of people to challenge and to 
participate in a challenge be preserved...." 
I think our motivation was, we did not want to put people to 
the requirement of having to fill out an amended return, which in 
some cases may involve them having to go hire an accountant, etc., 
to do that, if in fact they did not prevail in final appeal. 
R.1163. 
51
 The U.S. Supreme Court in Davis recognized that, "a tax 
exemption truly intended to account for differences in retirement 
benefits would not discriminate on the basis of the source of those 
benefits, as Michigan's [Utah's] does; rather, it would 
discriminate on the basis of the amount of benefits received by 
individual retirees." Davis at 817. 
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U.S.C. § 1408,52 principally to overrule McCarty and, thus, allow 
states to divide military retirement pay as marital property. 
Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah App. 1988) .53 It is 
clear Congress, in passing the USFSPA, viewed military retirement 
pay as exactly that, retirement pay, and not reduced pay for 
reduced services. 
Other state supreme courts confronting the military retirement 
issue in Davis related litigation have analyzed the military 
retirement pay issue and concluded that military retirement pay is 
deferred compensation. 
While it is true that Congress may have intended some portion 
of military retirement benefits to be current compensation for 
responsibilities accrued after retirement, see, e.g., McCarty, 
453 U.S. at 224 n.16, the overall scheme of the retirement 
benefits is akin to a civilian pension earned by the service 
member for years of active service. For example, in the army 
members are not allowed to draw retirement pay unless they 
have served a specified period of active service, normally 
twenty years. 10 U.S.C. § 3911 (1988). Retirement terminates 
the right to active duty pay and allowances. 37 U.S.C. § 
204(a) (1988). In addition, the amount of retirement pay is 
directly proportional to the number of years spent on active 
duty, (cites omitted). 
^ 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1983) reads ,f[A] court may treat 
disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay 
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of 
the member or as property of the member and his spouse in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court." 
53
 Defendants urge the court to ignore Greene because the 
Court must apply federal law in determining the retroactivity of a 
constitutional decision. Df bf p. 29, ftnt 4. While it is true the 
retroactivity of a constitutional decision is a matter of federal 
law, ATA, 110 S.Ct. at 2330, Greene is helpful in its analysis of 
whether military retirement pay is deferred compensation. Greene 
recognized that retired military personnel receive retirement pay. 
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Kuhn v. State Dept. of Revenue of State of Colo, 817 P.2d 101, 108 
(Colo. 1991) [Also see Pledger v. Bosnick, 306 Ark. 45, 811 S.W.2d 
286, 291 (1991), wherein Arkansas reached the same result: 
"We...believe that those cases which hold that military pay is 
actually deferred compensation or in the nature of a pension 
represent the better reasoned application of the law."]. 
Because military retirement pay is only received by one who 
serves at least twenty years in the military and because, as a 
general rule, retired military personnel do not provide any current 
service to the armed forces, military retirement pay has all the 
similarities of civilian retirement pay. This issue in the context 
of Davis litigation is now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.54 
XII. DEFENDANTS HAD MADE ALL OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINAL 
ORDER AT THE TIME IT WAS SIGNED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendants claim the trial court "did not allow Defendants the 
prescribed time to object to Plaintiffs1 Amended Proposed Findings, 
Conclusions, and Partial Summary Judgment". Df bf p. 89. 
The facts surrounding the signing of the Partial Summary 
Judgment are as follows: On March 26, 1991, Plaintiffs mailed to 
the Court and to Defendants, "Proposed Findings, Conclusions and 
54
 In Arkansas, the state supreme court ordered refunds to 
all federal retirees, including military retirees. The State of 
Arkansas appealed the military refund issue to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Pledger v. Bosnick, supra, petition for cert, filed (U.S. 
Sept. 3, 1991) (No. 91-375). In Kansas, the state supreme court 
denied the military retirees refunds under Davis. The military 
retirees appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which granted 
certiorari. Barker v. State of Kansas, 815 P.2d 46 (Kan. 1991) 
Cert, granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1991) (No. 91-611). 
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Partial Summary Judgment".55 Defendants filed "Objections to 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Partial Summary 
Judgment" on April 3, 1991. R. 1087. Plaintiffs mailed to the 
Court and to Defendants a "Reply to Defendants' Objections to 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Partial Summary 
Judgment" on April 10, 1991. R. 1094. Also on April 10, 1991, 
Plaintiffs mailed to the Court and to Defendants an "Amended 
Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgment." Df 
bf p. 89.56 The trial court acknowledged receiving the "Amended 
Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgment" in its 
Minute Entry of April 15, 1991, R. 1110, and approved the same "to 
be the final order of the Court." Id. Only minor changes were 
made in the different versions of the Proposed Findings, Amended 
Findings and Final Findings submitted to the trial court. These 
changes were set forth in a cover letter to the Court with a 
courtesy copy going to Defendants' counsel. 
Defendants claim they were deprived of the right to object 
under Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
because the Court signed the final order prior to Defendants 
objecting. However, as an examination of Defendants' "Objections 
to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Partial 
This document does not currently appear in the record, 
but is being added by amending the record. 
56
 This document is not found in the record, but is being 
added pursuant to amendment. 
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Summary Judgment11 bears out, Defendants did object and those 
objections are on the record. R. 1087. After the Court signed the 
Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgment on April 16, 
1991, Defendants filed another objection entitled "Defendants1 
Objections to Plaintiffs1 Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions 
and Partial Summary Judgment." R. 1143. This second objection 
simply renewed the objections made in the first objection and did 
not object to one additional finding that had not already been 
objected to. There was no error in signing the final Order because 
Defendants cannot point to any prejudice. All their rights in the 
trial court and on appeal have been protected. Defendants cannot 
and do not identify any objections they would have made had more 
time elapsed. 
XIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION. 
In Dennis v. Higgins, Director, v. Nebraska Department of 
Motor Vehicles, 111 S.Ct. 865 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
Nebraska's collection of motor carrier taxes to be a violation of 
the commerce clause to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereafter "§ 
1983") civil rights action against state taxing officials. In 
doing so, the Court summarized the law of § 1983. 
Last Term, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 
U.S. (1989), we set forth three considerations for 
determining whether a federal statute confers a "right" within 
the meaning of § 1983: 
"In deciding whether a federal right has been violated, we 
have considered [1] whether the provision in question creates 
obligations binding on the governmental unit or rather fdoes 
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no more than express a congressional preference for certain 
kinds of treatment.• Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). [2] The interest the 
plaintiff asserts must not be 'too vague and amorphous1 to be 
'beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.' Wright 
v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 
431-432 (1987) . [3] We have also asked whether the provision 
in question was 'intendfed] to benefit1 the putative 
plaintiff. Id. at 430; see also Id. at 433 (O1 Connor, J. 
dissenting) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)." Id. 
at . See also Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 
496 U.S. , (1990) (slip op. at ). 
Id. at 871. 
Plaintiffs meet all three tests applied to § 111. Defendants' 
defense, and the holding of the trial court, was that state 
officials enjoy a "qualified immunity" and cannot be sued for 
actions taken in their official capacity. 
In Hafer v. Melo, U.S. , 60 USLW 4001 (Case No. 90-
681, decided Nov. 5, 1991), the Supreme Court rejected the 
qualified immunity given state officials acting within their 
official capacity. In sustaining a § 1983 action against the 
Auditor General of Pennsylvania for violation of civil rights, the 
court held: 
State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are 
not "persons" for purposes of the suit because they assume the 
identity of the government that employs them. JJbid. By 
contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to 
court as individuals. A government official in the role of 
personal-capacity defendant thus fits comfortably within the 
statutory term "person." Cf. id., at 71, n. 10 ("[A] state 
official in his or her official capacity, when sued for 
injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because 
'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not 
treated as actions against the State'") (quoting Graham, 473 
U.S. at 167, n. 14). 
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Hafer seeks to overcome the distinction between official and 
personal-capacity suits by arguing that § 1983 liability turns 
not on the capacity in which state officials are sued, but on 
the capacity in which they acted when injuring the plaintiff. 
Under Will, she asserts, state officials may not be held 
liable in their personal capacity for actions they take in 
their official capacity. Although one Court of Appeals has 
endorsed this view, see Cowan v. University of Louisville 
School of Medicine, 900 F.2d 936, 942-943 (CA6 1990), we find 
it both unpersuasive as an interpretation of § 1983 and 
foreclosed by our prior decisions. 
Through § 1983, Congress sought "to give a remedy to parties 
deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities 
by an official's abuse of his position." Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Accordingly, it authorized suits to 
redress deprivations of civil rights by persons acting "under 
color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The requirement of action under 
color of state law means that Hafer may be liable for 
discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as 
Auditor General. We cannot accept the novel proposition that 
this same official authority insulates Hafer from suit. 
Id. USLW at p. 4003. 
Defendants' attempts to distinguish these cases from 
Plaintiffs' reliance on § 111 and the Davis decision should be read 
in light of Justice Kennedy's characterization of the Dennis rule: 
. . . the Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action 
when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunities, Davis v. Michigan Dept. of 
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989) (violation of statute 
"coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes 
embodied in the modern constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity. (emphasis added). 
Dennis, supra, 111 S.Ct. at 877. 
In addressing an appeal of the grant of a motion to dismiss, 
a reviewing court accepts as true the factual allegations contained 
in the amended complaint. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 
668 (Utah 1989). The facts alleged in Plaintiffs' amended 
-94-
complaint described a course of conduct by the individually named 
defendants which was designed to deprive Plaintiffs of their 
"rights, privileges and immunities secured by the constitution and 
laws" of the United States. § 1983. The allegations include: 
1. Defendants had between March 28, 1989 and April 17, 
1989 during which to inform Plaintiffs that they could 
file a claim for refund with Defendant Utah State Tax 
Commission. R. 92. 
2. Knowing Utah's taxation scheme violated Title 4 
U.S.C. Ill, Defendants intentionally and publicly 
misrepresented to Plaintiffs that the Davis case had no 
application in Utah, that Utah's taxation scheme was not 
in violation of Title 4 U.S.C. Ill, and that Plaintiffs 
need not file a claim for refund for the 1985 tax year. 
R. 92. 
3. Knowing Utah's taxation scheme was similar to 
Michigan's and that it violated Title 4 U.S.C. Section 
111, Defendants proceeded to collect taxes from 
Plaintiffs for the tax year 1988, which collection was 
unlawful, illegal, and amounted to an overpayment of 
taxes. R. 95. 
4. Defendants had between March 28, 1989 and April 17, 
1989 during which to inform Plaintiffs that no taxes 
would be due or collected as a result of income received 
by Plaintiffs during 1988 from federal retirement sources 
or to correctly inform Plaintiffs of the proper procedure 
under Utah law to receive a refund of taxes collected 
under an unconstitutional and illegal law. R. 95. 
5. Between March 28, 1989 and April 17, 1989, 
Defendants Hal Hansen, Joe Pacheco, Roger Tew, Blaine 
Davis and Clyde Nichols deprived Plaintiffs of their 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States in violation of 
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. R. 97. 
6. By releasing inaccurate and misleading information, 
Defendants conspired to deny Plaintiffs of the equal 
protection and exercise of Plaintiffs' equal privileges 
and immunities under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983. R. 97. 
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These allegations, if proven, would establish a course of 
conduct engaged in by Defendants which acted to deprive them of 
rights and immunities protected under the laws of the United 
States. 
The trial courtfs dismissal of Plaintiffs1 § 1983 action 
should be reversed. 
XIV. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS OF RETURN 
PREPARATION SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
Plaintiffs' award of attorneys1 fees from Defendants should be 
sustained under the § 1983 civil rights claim. The cost of return 
preparation is a proper award of consequential damages under § 
1983. 
The court coupled its declaratory order with an order in 
mandamus compelling the Commission to recognize and pay refund 
claims. The court may include with the mandamus order an award of 
damages and costs. "Costs" in a mandamus proceeding include 
attorneys1 fees. Colorado Dev. Co. v. Creer, 80 P.2d 914 (1938). 
XV. FREQUENT RECURRENCE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IS ESSENTIAL TO 
THE SECURITY OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE PERPETUITY OF FREE 
GOVERNMENT. 
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to 
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government." Utah Constitution, Art. I § 27. The provisions of 
the Utah Constitution are "mandatory and prohibitory", and are not 
simply words of advice. Id., Art. I § 26; See: Berry v. Beech, 
111 P.2d at 676. 
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As we celebrate this Fourth of July, we are reminded that one 
of the sparks which ignited the Revolutionary War was the 
abusive manner in which the colonists were being taxed by the 
King. Our forefathers fought and won independence from a King 
who extracted excessive taxes, and the Constitution was 
drafted to protect the people from such abuses. 
Beam v. Georgia, 382 S.E. 2d 95 (Ga. 1989) (Smith, Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.) 
Thirty-four thousand taxpayers stand before this Court with 
small but honest claims. These Utahn's paid their taxes with the 
trust good people have in good government: that the state would 
not tax them wrongly, and if the state discovered a mistake, it 
would give those taxes back. The state, they trust, would not be 
less honorable than its citizens who must timely pay their debts, 
sometimes with tremendous difficulty. But, honorable people remain 
honorable, even when it hurts. 
Now, their state acknowledges its mistake, but says it would 
be a financial burden to pay tax refunds. So, a seventy-eight year 
old retiree in Payson finds herself with a $1,100.00 claim the 
state says it cannot afford to pay. She does not know the other 
34,000 retirees. What she knows is that she has honestly paid her 
taxes and debts all her life and believes that laws must not be 
broken. Nothing is more fundamental to our free government than 
the basic trust between the government and each citizen, the 
taxpayer who pays its bills. 
The fundamental purpose of laws in a democracy is to protect 
the rights of each solitary citizen against the whims and perceived 
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needs of all the rest. The fundamental danger in flattening the 
law when the majority feels burdened is that we are all, sometimes, 
in the minority. 
This case presents an unusual and timely opportunity for 
recurrence to these fundamental principles. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
The trial courtfs earlier dismissal of Plaintiffs1 § 1983 action 
should be reversed and the case should be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 1H day of January, 1992. 
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Heber M. Weils Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84134 
CONTACT PERSON: Lee Shew FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
TELEPHONE: 530-6104(0) £32-6432 (h) 
DATE: April 5f1989 
SUPREME COURT RETIREMENT RULING WILL HAVE IMPACT IN UTAH 
The Utah State Tax Commission has received numerous 
inquiries concerning the recent U. S. Supreme Court ruling 
on a Michigan law which granted a tax exemption to state 
and local government retirees but taxed federal retirees. 
The initial assessment by the Tax Commission is that 
utan!s law is very similar to Micmgan's ana that the 
ruling will have an impact in Utah. 
Many questions coming to the Tax Commission have deal 
with three general areas: How should federal retirees 
treat their retirement income this year for state income 
taxes? will there be refunds on state taxes paid in pasi 
years? Should feaeral retirees amend their tax returns 
orctect tneir rignts unaer ~ne statute of 1 ^ i-cations? 
Accoraing to Tax Commissioner Roger C. Tew, MOur 
position is that all Utah taxDayers should file their ta 
as they would normally file unaer current Utah law. We 
view the Supreme Court ruling as aoplying to tax years 
beginning in 1989." 
"The Tax Commission takes tne same position as ctne 
states with similar laws, that refunas of past taxes pa 
oy feaeral employees are not manaated by the oecision, 
said Tew. 
-MORE-
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SUPREME COURT RULING 2-2-2-2 
If a taxpayer insists on ^iling an amended return to 
protect any legal rights for any year prior to 1989, the 
Tax Commission requests that the taxpayer print at the top 
of the tax return form, "Federal Retirement Amendment." 
There are approximately 34,000 federal retirees, 
including military retirees, in Utah. The Tax Commission 
is finalizing its estimation of the potential revenue 
implications of exemDting these retirees from state income 
tax, as state retirees are currently exemotea. The 
Commission is also analyzing the amount of potential 
revenue if state and local government plus education 
retirees were to be taxed on their retirement benefits. 
This information should be available later this week. 
Any changes in the state's treatment of retirement 
benefits will have to oe consiaerea by the legislature. 
•JnGer toth the Utah ana Micmgan laws, feaera'i pensions 
are taxed the same as those of private incustry. 3ut there 
is no taxation appliea to state and local government 
retirement income cr teacher retirement income. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Michigan law "violcites 
orincipies of intergovernmental tax immunity c> favoring 
retired state ana local government employees zver retirea 
feaeral emoloyees. 
* # # 
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EXHIBIT 2 
NOTICE TO FEDERAL RETIREES 
RE: DAVIS v. MICHIGAN PROTECTIVE CLAIMS 
If you paid income tax on federal retirement benefits for tax years 1985, 1986, 1987, 
and/or 1988, have not filed amended returns for those years and want to seek a refund, 
you must protect your claim. To do so you must either file an amended return for each 
year or complete this form. To protect claims tor 1985 or 1986, this form or amended 
return(s) must be mailed to the Tax Commission by April 16, 1990. You may file this 
form for 1987 and 1988 at a later date, but it must be done within the three-year 
deadline. Completing this form does not guarantee a refund. It only protects your claim 
to a refund if a refund is ordered by the courts. If refunds are ordered, you will have to 
file an amended return to determine the amount of refund due to you. 
PROTECTIVE CLAIM 
I hereby claim a refund of any Utah income tax paid in 1985, 1986,1987, and 1988 on 
federal retirement benefits. 
1985 1986 1987 1988 (Circle appropriate years) 
Name: 
last First M.l. 
Social Security No.: 
Mailing Address: 
Signature: Date: 
Mail notice to: Utah State Tax Commission 
160 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
Attn: Federal Retiree 
EXHIBIT 3 
Utah State Tax Commission 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
(801) 530-4848 or 1-800-662-4335 
Tax Bulletin 3-90 
Effective Date: February 21, 1990 
Re: Protective Claims for Federal Retirees 
The Utah Legislature has passed a bill that extends the statute of limita-
tions to April 16, 1990, for federal retirees filing protective claims for tax 
year 1985 In response to the Davis v. Michigan ruling. 
The enclosed Protective Claim form may be substituted for an 
amended return and only requires federal retirees to provide their 
names, Social Security numbers, addresses and signatures. One form 
can provide protection for all of the years in question during the litiga-
tion. This form may be photocopied. 
However, the Tax Commission emphasizes that protective claims for 
tax years 1985 and 1986 must be filed by April 16. 1990. If only filing 
protective claims for 1987 or 1988, the taxpayer may file later than that 
date, but within the three-year statute of limitations. 
The Tax Commission also will honor as protective claims incomplete 
amended returns and other communications filed earlier by federal 
retirees. 
However, if refunds are ordered by the courts, retirees who either filed 
the new form or incomplete amended returns will have to file accurate 
amended returns to determine their correct refund amounts, 
Questions regarding this Tax Bulletin should be directed to Taxpayer 
Services, 160 East Third South, Salt Lake City, UT 84134, or by calling 
(801) 530-4848 or toll free within Utah 1-800-662-4335. 
EXHIBIT 4 
Ch. 4 THE STATES 
§ 1 1 1 . Same; taxation affecting Federal employees; income tax 
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for 
personal service as an officer or employee of the United States, a territory or 
possession or political subdivision thereof, the government of the District of 
Columbia, or an agency or instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, 
by a duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation 
does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source 
of the pay or compensation. 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
59-10-529. Overpayment of tax — Credits — Re-
funds. 
(1) In cases where there has been an overpayment 
of any tax imposed by this chapter, the amount of 
overpayment is credited as follows: 
(a) against any income tax then due from the 
taxpayer, 
(b) against the amount of any judgment 
against the taxpayer, including one ordering the 
payment of a fine or of restitution to a victim 
under Section 76-3-201, obtained through due 
process of law by any entity of state government; 
(c) against any child support obligation which 
is delinquent, as determined by the Office of Re-
covery Services in the Department of Human 
Services, in enforcing, under Title IV-D of the 
Social Security Act, a court or administrative or-
der for support of a child which has not been re-
duced to judgment, and after notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing, as provided in Subsection 
(2); 
(d) as bail, to ensure the appearance of the tax-
payer before the appropriate authority to resolve 
an outstanding warrant against the taxpayer for 
which bail is due, if a court of competent jurisdic-
tion has not approved an alternative form of pay-
ment. This bail may be applied to any fine or 
forfeiture which is due and related to a warrant 
which is outstanding on or after February 16, 
1984, and in accordance with Subsections (3) and 
(4). 
(2) (a) Subsection (l)(c) may be exercised only if 
the Office of Recovery Services serves prior writ-
ten notice on the taxpayer by personal service or 
certified mail, restricted delivery, stating: 
(i) the amount of child support which is 
alleged to be delinquent; and 
(ii) that the overpayment shall be applied 
to reduce that alleged child support debt un-
less the taxpayer appears at an administra-
tive hearing before the department and suc-
cessfully contests the child support debt or 
the application of the overpayment to that 
debt. 
(b) If an overpayment of tax is credited against 
a delinquent child support obligation in accor-
dance with Subsection (l)(c) in non-AFDC cases, 
the Office of Recovery Services shall inform the 
non-AFDC custodial parent in advance if it will 
first use any portion of the overpayment to sat-
isfy unreimbursed AFDC or foster care mainte-
nance payments which have been provided to 
that family. 
(c) The Department of Human Services shall 
establish rules to implement this subsection, in-
cluding procedures, in accordance with the other 
provisions of this section, to ensure prompt reim-
bursement to the taxpayer of any amount of an 
overpayment of taxes which was credited against 
a child support obligation in error, and to ensure 
prompt distribution of properly credited funds to 
the custodial parent. 
(3) Subsection (l)(d) may be exercised only if: 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
(a) a court has issued a warrant for the arrest 
of the taxpayer for failure to post bail, appear, or 
otherwise satisfy the terms of a citation, sum-
mons, or court order; and 
(b) a notice of intent to apply the overpayment 
as bail on the issued warrant has been mailed to 
the person's current address on file with the com-
mission. 
(4) (a) The commission shall deliver the overpay-
ment applied as bail to the court that issued the 
warrant of arrest. The clerk of the court is autho-
rized to endorse the check or commission warrant 
of payment on behalf of the payees and deposit 
the monies in the court treasury. 
(b) The court receiving the overpayment ap-
plied as bail shall order withdrawal of the war-
rant for arrest of the taxpayer if the case is one 
for which a personal appearance of the taxpayer 
is not required and if die dollar amount of the 
overpayment represents the full dollar amount of 
bail. In all other cases, the court receiving the 
overpayment applied as bail is not required to 
order the withdrawal of the warrant of arrest of 
the taxpayer during the 40-day period, and the 
taxpayer may be arrested on the warrant. How-
ever, the bail amount shall be reduced by the 
amount of tax overpayment received by the 
court. 
(c) If the taxpayer fails to respond to the notice 
described in Subsection (3), or to resolve the war-
rant within 40 days after the mailing under that 
subsection, the overpayment applied as bail is 
forfeited and notice of the forfeiture shall be 
mailed to the taxpayer at the current address on 
file with the commission. The court may then 
issue another warrant or allow the original war-
rant to remain in force if: 
(i) the taxpayer has not complied with an 
order of the court; 
(ii) the taxpayer has failed to appear and 
respond to a criminal charge for which a per-
sonal appearance is required; or 
(iii) the taxpayer has paid partial but not 
full bail in a case for which a personal ap-
pearance is not required. 
(5) If the alleged violations named in the warrant 
are later resolved in favor of the taxpayer, the bail 
amount shall be remitted to the taxpayer. 
(6) Any balance shall be refunded immediately to 
the taxpayer. 
(7) (a) If a refund or credit is due because the 
amount of tax deducted and withheld from wages 
exceeds the actual tax due, no refund or credit 
may be made or allowed unless the taxpayer or 
his legal representative files with the commis-
sion a tax return claiming the refund or credit: 
(i) within three years from the due date of 
the return, plus the period of any extension 
of time for filing the return; or 
(ii) within two years from the date the tax 
was paid, whichever period is later, 
(b) In other instances where a refund or credit 
of tax which has not been deducted and withheld 
from income is due, no credit or refund may be 
allowed or made after three years from the time 
the tax was paid, unless, before the expiration of 
the period, a claim is filed by the taxpayer or his 
legal representative. 
(8) The fine and bail forfeiture provisions of this 
section apply to all warrants and fines issued in cases 
charging the taxpayer with a felony, a misdemeanor, 
or an infraction described in this section which are 
outstanding on or after February 16, 1984. 
(9) If the amount allowable as a credit for tax with-
held from the taxpayer exceeds the tax to which the 
credit relates, the excess is considered an overpay-
ment. 
(10) A claim for credit or refund of an overpayment 
which is attributable to the application to the tax-
payer of a net operating loss carryback shall be fried 
within three years from the time the return was due 
for the taxable year of the loss. 
(11) If there has been an overpayment of the tax 
which is required to be deducted and withheld under 
Section 59-10-402, a refund shall be made to the em-
ployer only to the extent that the amount of overpay-
ment was not deducted and withheld by the em-
ployer. 
(12) If there is no tax liability for a period in which 
an amount is paid as income tax, the amount is an 
overpayment. 
(13) If an income tax is assessed or collected after 
the expiration of the applicable period of limitation, 
that amount is an overpayment. 
(14) (a) If a taxpayer is required to report a 
change or correction in federal taxable income 
reported on his federal income tax return, or to 
report a change or correction which is treated in 
the same manner as if it were an overpayment 
for federal income tax purposes, or to file an 
amended return with the commission, a claim for 
credit or refund of any resulting overpayment of 
tax shall be filed by the taxpayer within two 
years from the date the notice of the change, cor-
rection, or amended return was required to be 
filed with the commission. 
(b) If the report or amended return is not filed 
within 90 days, interest on any resulting refund 
or credit ceases to accrue after the 90-day period. 
(c) The amount of the credit or refund may not 
exceed the amount of the reduction in tax attrib-
utable to the federal change, correction, or items 
amended on the taxpayer's amended federal in-
come tax return. 
(d) Except as specifically provided, this section 
does not affect the amount or the time within 
which a claim for credit or refund may be filed. 
(15) No credit or refund may be allowed or made if 
the overpayment is less than $1. 
(16) The amount of the credit or refund may not 
exceed the tax paid during the three years immedi-
ately preceding the filing of the claim, or if no claim 
is filed, then during the three years immediately pre-
ceding the allowance of the credit or refund. 
(17) In the case of an overpayment of tax by the 
employer under the withholding provisions of this 
chapter, a refund or credit shall be made to the em-
ployer only to the extent that the amount of the over-
payment was not deducted and withheld from wages 
under the provisions of this chapter. 
(18) If a taxpayer who is entitled to a refund under 
this chapter dies, the commission may make payment 
to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the 
taxpayer's estate. If there is no executor or adminis-
trator, payment may be made to those persons who 
establish entitlement to inherit the property of the 
decedent in the proportions set out in Title 75. 
(19) Where an overpayment relates to adjustments 
to net income referred to in Subsection 59-10-536 
(3)(c), credit may be allowed or a refund paid any 
time before the expiration of the period within which 
a deficiency may be assessed. 1990 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available, ex-
cept that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter. 1988 
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts ~ Form — Effect. 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions 
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. 
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground 
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The 
declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and 
effect; and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a 
final judgment or decree. 
78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or 
statutes may be determined. 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, 
or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a 
statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have 
determined any question of construction or validity arising under 
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and 
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations 
thereunder. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 2 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform 
their government as the public welfare may require. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty of property, 
without due process of law. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 11 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 24 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. VIII, § 5 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and 
power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of 
right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
